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ABSRACT 
Title:  Does the CEO manipulate earnings prior to routine departure? – An 
empirical study about earnings management prior to routine CEO 
departure on Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm 
Seminar Date: 2015-05-25 
Course: FEKN90: Degree project, Master of Science in Business and 
Economics (30 University credit points) 
Authors: Biljana Colevska and Ida Lindgren 
Advisor: Per Magnus Andersson 
Key words: Routine CEO departure, earnings management, discretionary 
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market 
Purpose: The aim of the study is to empirically describe and analyze whether 
and if so why CEOs on Swedish public firms, listed on NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm, use earnings management prior to routine CEO 
departures. 
 
Theoretical perspective: This study is based on prior research that examines the relationship 
between routine CEO departures and the use of earnings management 
and literature on earnings management. Furthermore, the theories 
used in this thesis are based on the agency theory, the stakeholder and 
shareholder theory, compensation, corporate governance and 
ownership structure. 
 
Methodology: A quantitative study is made with a deductive approach by running a 
cross sectional regression to measure the use of discretionary accruals 
and a panel data regression on the explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, a panel data regression is used to measure the use of 
research and development expenses prior to a routine CEO departure. 
Empirical foundations: The analysis includes companies listed on NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm with a routine CEO departure between the period 2007 to 
2014.  
Conclusion: Real earnings management occurs prior to routine CEO departures, 
while there tends to be less use of accruals management. A negative 
significant relationship is found between board independence, 
institutional ownership, market capitalization and earnings 
management. A positive significant relationship is found between the 
market book ratio and earnings management.  
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1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the reader about the background for earnings management in relation 
to routine CEO departures. It highlights the current condition for Swedish public firms and 
why it is of essence to examine and mitigate the phenomena. Furthermore the purpose of this 
study is presented and finally the disposition. 
 
1.1 Background 
The following quote emphasizes the increased importance of examining CEOs possible 
incentives for using earnings management the years prior to leaving the office.  
 
“Executives who place little value on future earnings relative to current earnings face 
stronger incentives to improve short term earnings performance. One class of executives who 
are likely to place little value on future earnings are those who have short horizon because 
they are expecting to leave their position in the near future” (Dechow & Sloan, 1991, p 54). 
 
Earnings management can be defined as “the practice of distorting the true financial 
performance of the company” (Klein, 2002, p 376). It occurs when financial reporting and 
structuring of transactions are used by managers to make changes to financial reports with the 
aim to either mislead some stakeholders about the company’s underlying economic 
performance or to have an impact on contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). The phenomenon can be classified into three 
main categories: fraudulent accounting, accruals management and real earnings management 
(Ronen & Yaari, 2008).  The first category refers to accounting choices that violate the 
accounting laws such as IFRS or GAAP. The second category, accruals management, refers to 
accounting choices which lies within the accounting law but where actions actively have been 
taken in order to try to conceal or obscure the true economic performance of the company 
(Dechow &Skinner, 2000). The last category, real earnings management, refers to actions 
undertaken by the CEO that deviate from best practice (Ronen & Yaari, 2008). This thesis 
focuses on the last two categories. 
 
There are well-known examples of powerful firms manipulating earnings and taking 
fraudulent measures such as Enron Corporation and WorldCom Incorporated. In the first case, 
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Enron’s earnings had been overstated by several $100 million dollars, which among other 
things was possible due to them having subsidiaries in Cayman Island, utilizing tax loopholes 
(McGill & Outslay, 2002). For instance, Enron was selling assets to these subsidiaries for 
inflated prices, without mentioning it in the company’s external accounting. Management was 
also found guilty for insider trading, before the firm filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The 
bankruptcy affected many stakeholders, especially employees who had retirement savings in 
company stock (Oppel, 2001). In the second case, which is quite similar to Enron, WorldCom 
was found guilty for inflating profits by improperly spreading operating costs (Tran, 2002). 
After these scandals an increased awareness is directed towards giving a true and fair view of 
financial accounting. Regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) are established in 
response to accounting scandals such as Enron and WorldCom. Despite the fact that Sweden 
has not yet suffered from large accounting scandals, there are cases such as Trustor and 
Skandia which have resulted in a higher need for control of public companies. Equivalent to 
Sarbanes Oxley Act, Sweden introduced the Corporate Governance Code in 2005 to firms 
listed on the A-list and firms on the O-list with a market cap over 3 billion SEK (Kollegiet för 
Svensk bolagsstyrning, 2009.) However, NASDAQ OMX Stockholm was introduced in 
October 2006, which meant that public firms had other requirements than previously and the 
Code comprised all Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm first in 2008 
(Kollegiet för svensk bolagsstyrning, 2009). 
 
Over the years, media have directed more attention towards departing CEOs and the large 
bonuses they receive when leaving the office. A well-known example highlighted in media 
was when ABB’s CEO Percy Barnevik departed after 8 years and received a large retirement 
bonus (Carlsson & Nachemson-Ekwall, 1996). The CEO left the office in a well-planned and 
peaceful way, which in academic research is referred to as a routine departure
1
 (Ronen & 
Yaari, 2008). Furthermore, the compensation plan was a combination of the final salary and 
bonus based on ABBs result and stock price (Nachemson-Ekwall, 2002). As a result of the 
large stock price increase and the good firm performance over the years Barnevik received a 
compensation of 930 million SEK. He also received a directorship on the board after leaving 
the office (Fagerström, 2002). However, according to Peter Wallenberg the accounting 
statements in ABB were misleading during the years Barnevik was CEO.  The large 
compensation and the misleading accounting directed more attention towards Barnevik, which 
                                                          
1
 The definition of routine departures is presented under section 1.5 
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resulted in him paying back 548 million SEK in 2002 (Gripenberg, 2007). Examples similar 
to ABB have led to criticism directed towards the compensation contracts that are linked to 
financial reporting in Swedish corporations, as it might create incentives for the CEO to 
engage in earnings management at the shareholders’ expense. However, the example also 
highlights the incitement to receive a directorship. The incentive to receive a directorship after 
departure can lead the use of earnings management during the years prior to routine departure 
(Brickley, Coles & Linck, 1999; Reitenga & Tearney, 2003).  
 
Despite the increased attention towards departing CEOs, there are no academic studies in 
Sweden, to the authors’ knowledge, specifically examining a CEO’s incentives to engage in 
earnings management prior to a routine departure. In theory, a CEO that planning to leave the 
office has larger incentives to engage in opportunistic behavior than a CEO who does not plan 
to leave: a phenomenon often referred to as the horizon problem (Dechow & Sloan, 1991; 
Cheng, 2004; Kalyta, 2009). The horizon problem is divided into two aspects: the short 
horizon problem and the post horizon problem (Reitenga & Tearney, 2003). According to 
Reitenga and Tearney (2003) the problems lead to that a CEO might have incentives to make 
discretionary accounting choices in order to (1) receive a higher bonus when leaving the 
office or (2) receive a directorship after departure. These issues lead to several studies within 
the field of earnings management and routine CEO departure (Dechow & Sloan, 1991; 
Brickley, Coles & Linck, 1999; Reitenga & Tearney, 2003; Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 
2005) testing different explanatory variables and implications in order to try to explain what 
might impact a departing CEO’s incentives to act opportunistically. As a reaction to the 
mentioned scandals such as Enron and WorldCom, recent studies have a larger focus on 
controlling for corporate governance mechanisms and the ownership structures impact on 
routine CEO departure in relation to earnings management (Reitenga & Tearney, 2003; 
Bebchuk & Fried, 2006). Therefore, the authors of this study have the same aspect, as the 
Swedish Corporate Governance Code could have a different impact on a departing CEO’s 
possibilities to manipulate earnings than the SOX have in the United States.  
1.2 Problem Discussion  
Prior research shows that routine outgoing CEOs will attempt to increase reported earnings in 
their final year(s) to receive larger bonus payments, referred to as the short horizon hypothesis 
(Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Brickley, Coles & Linck, 1999; Reitenga & Tearney, 2003). Some 
of the research also finds evidence showing that outgoing CEOs not only manipulate earnings 
8 | P a g e  
 
in order to receive higher bonus payments but also in order to take a board seat, referred to as 
the post horizon hypothesis (Brickley, Coles & Linck, 1999; Reitenga &Tearney, 2003). 
There are multiple other explanations for a CEOs attempt to increase earnings in the final 
year, such as reputation, honour or the desire to meet or beat earnings benchmarks (Graham, 
Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005). However, these factors are hard to measure which might explain 
why prior research gives it little focus.      
 
There are several discretionary ways for a CEO to boost the firm value during the final year(s) 
at the office. Research shows that CEOs who planning to leave the firm are significantly 
lowering the firm’s research and development costs during their final year(s), since the 
outgoing CEO does not receive the full future benefit which is incurred by the current costs of 
research and development via bonus and compensation plans (Dechow & Sloan, 1991; 
Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993). However, most studies examine the use of accruals 
management and find that CEOs planning to leave the firm significantly increase the 
manipulation of accruals prior to departure (Brickley, Coles & Linck, 1999; Reitenga & 
Tearney, 2003). One of the outcomes from the financial crises in the late 90s and early 2000s 
is an increased awareness among investors and the media on firms’ incorporation of corporate 
governance. According to Reitenga and Tearney (2003) one important corporate governance 
mechanism which has an impact on the use of earnings management, prior to routine CEO 
departure, is board composition. The boards main objective is to reduce the problem with the 
separation of ownership and control in public corporations by acting in the best interest of the 
shareholders and ensuring that the actions of managers serves their interest (Fama & Jensen, 
1983) . The board of directors can ensure that the CEO acts in the interest of the shareholder 
by adopting compensation plans, structured to provide CEOs with efficient incentives to 
maximize shareholder value. Nevertheless after the corporate governance scandals in 2001, it 
has been recalled that many boards have employed compensation arrangements which do not 
serve shareholders’ interest (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006). This has perverted pay arrangements, 
decreased CEOs’ incentives to improve firm value and also provided distort incentives to 
reduce long-term firm value (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006). The findings underline the importance 
to control for the variable salary compensation, but also for different board composition 
variables, such as board size and board independence (Reitenga & Tearney, 2003; Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2006). Swedish public firms follow the Swedish Corporate Governance Code, which 
indirectly might mitigate CEOs possibility to engage in earnings management. However, as 
the Swedish Corporate Governance Code is not mandatory, but rather a norm, (Swedish 
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Corporate Governance Code, 2010), it is questionable whether it is enough. By controlling for 
corporate governance mechanisms as board size and board independence, this thesis tries to 
test for this. Does the Swedish Corporate Governance Code mitigate CEO’s incentives to act 
opportunistically prior to routine departure? 
 
Another factor possibly having an impact on CEOs’ incentives to manipulate earnings prior to 
departure is ownership structure which can be tied to the principal agent theory and the costs 
of monitoring. Theory states that owners with larger ownership stake have higher incentives 
to monitor the agent (Reitenga & Tearney, 2003). This stresses the importance to test for 
different ownership variables such as institutional ownership and blockholding. Furthermore 
this study examines all
2
 routine CEO departures on Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm, which includes firms from different industries and with different size. These are 
differences that might have a great impact on the CEO´s actions. In order to make reliable 
assumptions, the authors also control for firm characteristics such as market capitalization and 
the market to book ratio. 
 
This study can be considered to be of great importance and a contribution to this field of 
research because of several factors. Firstly, it is of essence to know which factors that 
potentially impact the CEOs use of earnings management during routine departure, since 
IFRS and the Swedish Corporate Governance Code could then be adjusted in order to mitigate 
these incentives. Secondly, the findings of this thesis can help potential investors to know 
what to look for when investing in a firm thus making the correct investment decision. This is 
very important since the majority of the Swedish population, directly or indirectly, through 
funds and pension plans are shareholders. Therefore they are affected by the actions taken by 
a CEO on a public firm prior to routine departure. Lastly, the majority of prior research is 
conducted on the U.S. market, where laws and regulations differ from Sweden. Therefore, the 
authors conduct this study with a comparative approach and examine whether one country´s 
laws and regulations might be more useful than the other, when it comes to mitigating the use 
of earnings management.  
                                                          
2
 Excluding financials, see 1.4 Delimitation 
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1.3 Purpose 
The aim of the study is to empirically describe and analyze whether and if so why, CEOs on 
Swedish public firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, use earnings management prior 
to routine CEO departures. 
1.4 Delimitation 
First, the authors are not interested in examining financial companies as they follow a 
different accounting practice than the rest of the industries listed on NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm (Lag 1995:1559). Second, the choice of focusing on the regulated market and not 
the trading platform is due to the fact that only these firms need to follow IFRS and the 
Swedish Corporate Governance Code. Lastly, as NASDAQ OMX Stockholm is established in 
late 2006 combined with the fact that it is the authors’ ambition to examine the current 
situation, the study is delimited to the period 2007 to 2014. 
1.5 Routine CEO departure 
In order for the reader to easily understand and follow the different concepts and theories in 
the thesis it is important to clarify how a routine CEO departure is defined. 
 
This study investigates routine CEO departures, which are defined as well-planned and 
peaceful. Routine CEO departures are seen as a process where the outgoing CEO retires, stays 
within the firm or leaves the firm on his or her own initiative. In order to define it as a 
departure, there has to be an event where the CEO leaves his or her position and a new person 
takes over. The authors of this thesis choose to define routine CEO departures as defined 
above. 
1.6 Audience 
This thesis is of interest to board of directors of firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm 
and stakeholders striving to learn more about earnings management and routine CEO 
departure in Swedish listed firms. This study is also of interest to academics in the field of 
finance and auditing who may want to further explore earnings management prior to routine 
CEO departure. 
1.7 Thesis outline 
The chapters in this thesis are structured according to the following outline: Chapter two 
presents the theoretical framework which the thesis is based on and the hypotheses for the 
regressions are formed. In order to gain a better understanding for the outcome of this thesis, 
chapter three highlights the relevant differences among laws and regulations between U.S. 
11 | P a g e  
 
and Sweden. Chapter four develops the theoretical part into a research approach where details 
about the two substudies: Substudy 1 and Substudy 2 data set, statistical methods and 
explanatory variables are presented. Chapter four also includes discussions regarding OLS-
assumptions and potential methodological problems in terms of validity, reliability and 
replicability. Chapter five presents the empirical findings of the substudies. Chapter six 
analyzes the empirical findings as well as a discussion in the context of the theoretical 
framework and empirical literature presented. Lastly, the seventh chapter the further discusses 
the analysis presented in chapter five on a higher level where conclusions, recommendations 
and proposals for further research are provided.  
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2. Theoretical framework and empirical 
hypotheses 
In this chapter empirical findings of previous research are first discussed to establish an 
understanding for the issue concerning CEO’s incentives to use earnings management prior 
to routine departure. In addition, the theoretical framework is presented. Finally, based on 
the previous research and the theoretical framework presented empirical hypothesis are 
established and motivated.  
2.1 Empirical findings of previous research 
To clarify how routine CEO departures influence the use of earnings management it is 
relevant to identify what prior research find.  
 
Smith and Watts (1982) are among the first to link executive compensation plans to earnings 
management. At that time, their study was of interest since executive compensation plans, 
based on firm performance had not existed for a long period of time and were increasing in 
popularity. They state that there are at least two potential reasons for the increased popularity 
of executive compensation plans.  The first is the tax incentives, and the second is the 
compensation encouraging executives to maximize firm value. The result of the study shows 
that tax incentives cannot explain some of the cross-sectional differences in the sample, but 
the incentive effects of compensation plans can. Healy (1985) also investigated the 
relationship between earnings management and bonuses and states that when the economic 
earning yield falls between the minimum and maximum bonus the manager has an incentive 
to increase his current payoff by inflating the accounting earnings.  
 
Similarly to Smith and Watts (1982) and Healy (1985), Dechow and Sloan (1991) examine 
the relationship between variable salary compensation and earnings management.  Dechow 
and Sloan (1991) finds evidence that support the short horizon hypothesis. Their study is 
conducted on American manufacturing firms between 1979 and 1989 that have a routine CEO 
departure. The sample is restricted to industries with a R&D expenses to sales ratio above five 
percent. Another requirement is that the CEO has a variable compensation linked to the fixed 
salary prior to departure. They link executive compensation plans to discretionary accounting 
with the R&D expenses variable and find that CEOs who plans to leave the firm are 
significantly lowering their research and development costs during the final year. According 
13 | P a g e  
 
to the researchers’ findings one explanatory reason for the CEOs behavior is that the CEO in a 
routine departure does not receive the full future benefits that is incurred by the current costs 
of R&D via bonus and compensation plans. Therefore, there is a possibility that the outgoing 
CEO reduces these expenditures in the year(s) before the planned departure. Correspondingly 
to Dechow and Sloan (1991), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) controls for the short horizon 
hypothesis. Contradicting to Dechow and Sloans (1991) study, Murphy and Zimmerman 
(1993) examine all American firms with routine departure between 1971 and 1990. In 
addition, they link not only R&D expenses as one potential variable for managerial discretion, 
but also advertising costs, capital expenditures and discretionary accruals. However, their 
study does not find any evidence that support the short horizon hypothesis. The researchers 
conclude that the change in the discretionary variables is mostly due to the financial 
performance of the company. Gao and Shrieves (2002) examine the association of the 
components of the compensation package with the intensity of earnings management. They 
find that earnings management is negatively associated with salary and positively associated 
with stock options and bonuses. Studies have shown that assessment and bargaining power 
controlled by the board of directors decline if the CEO performs well (Adams, Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2010), hence a CEO with bargaining power usually bargain for more 
compensation.   
 
Brickley, Coles and Linck (1999) examine the relationship between earnings management and 
the short horizon hypothesis, similarly to prior research (Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Murphy & 
Zimmerman, 1993). However, they are among the first to link the use of earnings 
management during routine CEO departures to the post horizon problem. They study U.S. 
firms listed on Forbes annual executive survey between 1989 and 1993 and examine the 
relationship between board seat retention and discretionary accruals. They find a strong 
positive relationship between firm performance during the departing CEOs four final years 
and the likelihood of retaining a board seat after departure. Their study is thereby suggesting 
an additional source of CEO incentives that has not been previously discussed.    
 
After the crisis in the late 20th and early 21st century
3
 the focus turned to corporate 
governance and the composition of the board (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006, Ronen & Yaari, 2008). 
Reitenga and Tearney (2003) control for corporate governance mechanisms prior to routine 
                                                          
3 the dot-com bubble 2000 and the financial crises in 2008. 
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CEO departure. The researchers examine both the post horizon hypothesis and the short 
horizon hypothesis.  Furthermore, Reitenga and Tearney (2003) use cross-sectional data on 
the Jones cash-flow model to measure the use of discretionary accruals prior to routine CEO 
departure. Their findings show strong evidence of earnings management in the final year and 
the final two years prior to routine CEO departure and find evidence that support the post 
horizon hypothesis, which is consistent to Brickley, Coles and Linck (1999). However, their 
results are inconsistent with the short horizon hypothesis as discretionary accruals are more 
income-increasing in year -1 and not in the CEOs’ final year (year 0). Reitenga and Tearney 
(2003) also find that independent directors mitigate the use of earnings management and that 
institutional ownership exacerbates earnings management in a CEO’s final years. 
 
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) conduct both a qualitative and quantitative study on 
executives. In the qualitative part of their study the researchers document that three quarters 
of the responding executives in their study consider upward mobility in the labor market to be 
more important than the short run compensation benefits i.e. the short horizon hypothesis. 
This means that CEOs find it more important to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, build 
credibility, maintain or increase stock price and improving the external reputation. This is due 
to the career concern motivations for the departing CEOs that are found to be important. In 
the quantitative part of their study they find that most earnings management is achieved via 
real earnings management as opposed to accrual earnings management. Managers take real 
economic actions such as delaying research and development expenses or advertising costs in 
order to meet earnings benchmarks.  
 
As can be inferred from this section prior research have both focused on earnings 
management in form of discretionary accruals and real earnings management. Real earnings 
management refers to actions undertaken by the CEO such as delaying or giving up R&D 
expenses and advertising costs in order to meet the short term earnings target. This thesis is 
therefore divided into two substudies. The first substudy focuses on accruals earnings 
management by measuring the use of discretionary accruals prior to routine CEO departure. 
The second substudy focuses on real earnings management by measuring the use of R&D 
expenses prior to routine CEO departure.       
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2.2 Agency theory 
When discussing corporate governance in terms of the system of control, regulations and 
attempts to design incentives to hinder fraud, its main focus is often the existing conflict of 
interest and the endeavor to reduce them.  According to Eisenhardt (1989) the agency theory 
aspires to reconcile two problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first agency 
problem occurs as a result of conflicting goals or desires between the principal and agent. It 
also occurs as a result of being costly or difficult for the principal to confirm the agents’ 
actions. This can be referred to the agency cost of managerial incentives. It is costly for the 
principal to decrease the agency problem. The costs are usually divided into three groups: 
monitoring costs, bonding costs and shrinking costs (Ogden, Jen & O'Connor, 2003). Since 
the costs are large it is understandable that an owner with small ownership stakes is not 
interested in taking on these costs. The incentives might however be greater for investors with 
large ownership stakes such as blockholders or institutions. According to Fama and Jensen 
(1983) this conflict is likely to happen when a key decision maker does not have financial 
interest in the outcome of his or her decisions. The second agency problem concerns risk 
sharing that occur when the principal and agent have different risk attitudes, hence they may 
lean towards different actions due to different preferences towards risk. The agent, for 
example a CEO, hired by the principal, for example the owner, cannot diversify away its risk 
in the same way as the owner can. Hence, it is likely that the agent is more risk-averse than 
the principal.  
 
Prior research shows that there is a relationship between the agency problem and earnings 
management during routine CEO departure. The CEO (agent) might have incentives to 
increase reported earnings by using earnings management in the final year on the expense of 
the firms’ shareholders (principals), as he or she wants to receive a greater variable 
compensation and/or increase the probability of having a seat on the board after the routine 
departure.  
2.3 Stakeholder-, and shareholder theory  
As the study examines public companies during routine CEO departure, there is a higher 
degree of stakeholders which are interested in the well-being and survival of the firm.  
According to the stakeholder and shareholder theory, the view towards investors differs. 
Therefore, it is relevant to introduce these theories. 
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In order to manage the day to day business a firm needs capital. When a firm grows and need 
to implement significant investments they might not have all the capital they need to fund all 
their expenses. Instead they might need to attract external capital. In Sweden and the majority 
of Europe, both the state and the union have a strong influence on the corporations. This leads 
to several outcomes but the major one is that firms need to focus more on their stakeholders
4
. 
In these markets the shareholders have less protection since they are only one out of several 
important stakeholders. This in turn leads to that both the shareholders and the banks are 
considered as major creditors to these corporations (Moffett, Stonehill & Eiteman, 
2003).  This is not the case in the Anglo-Saxon markets, where neither the state nor the union 
has the same control. In these countries, the shareholders are considered to be the most 
important stakeholder and creditor of the firm. This leads to two different approaches of 
corporate governance. The first approach is the stakeholder theory characterized by European 
markets and the second approach is characterized by the Anglo-Saxon markets and is called 
shareholder theory. These different approaches will most likely affect the use of earnings 
management, since the earnings management phenomenon is built on the belief that the 
shareholders and all the stakeholders can be fooled. As this thesis aims to investigate firms 
listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, the result can differ from the studies discussed under 
prior research. 
2.4 Empirical hypothesis 
2.4.1 The horizon problem  
A horizon effect exists when a CEO retires or separates from his or her job and approaches a 
well-defined point. The question is how the horizon problem impacts a manager’s investment 
decision, an issue that is examined in several studies (Dechow & Sloan, 1991; Murphy & 
Zimmerman, 1993; Brickley, Coles & Linck, 1999; Reitenga & Tearney, 2003). 
Correspondingly, Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) state that a horizon problem exists when 
the outgoing CEOs have incentives, as they are approaching a known departure or retirement, 
to make accounting choices or investment plans that increase current earnings during the 
years prior to departure at the expense of the firm’s future earnings. These issues lead to two 
hypotheses that will be further discussed below called the short horizon hypothesis and the 
post horizon problem 
                                                          
4
 Shareholders, employees, clients, creditors, suppliers, the government and the society. 
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2.4.1.1 The short horizon hypothesis  
The short horizon hypothesis predicts that CEOs in a routine departure will try to increase 
reported earnings in their final year with the aim to receive a larger variable bonus payment 
(Reitenga & Tearney, 2003). There is empirical evidence that CEOs reduce research and 
development expenditures in their final year (Dechow & Sloan, 1991) in order to receive a 
larger variable bonus payment. On the contrary, there is not as much evidence showing that 
CEOs use discretionary accruals in order to increase earnings in their final year (Murphy & 
Zimmerman, 1993). However, in order to conclude if similar empirical results are found in 
Sweden, both research and development expenses and discretionary accruals are measured. 
 
In order to control for the short horizon problem it is important to understand that there are 
several possible ways for a firm to compensate its CEO. Some of the components 
are increasing the salary, stock options, variable salary compensation and vacation. In this 
study the main focus will be on variable salary compensation, since it typically is paid on 
accounting measures of performance such as earnings (Murphy, 1999). This potentially gives 
managers an incentive to accept negative NPV projects where expenses are foisted first after 
the CEO departure rather than accepting positive NPV projects which have a long payback 
(Smith & Watts, 1982). In Sweden, the board of directors of public firms listed on NASDAQ 
OMX Stockholm delegate their decision-making authority to the compensation committee to 
calculate the variable salary designated to the CEO. A bonus depends on achieving a 
performance target, an element that is sensitive to firm size and growth (Ittner, Lacker & 
Rajan, 1997; Nagar, 2002). Salary affects the payment of bonus, since target bonus typically 
is expressed as a percentage of base salary (Holthausen, Larcker & Sloan, 1995; Murphy, 
1999).  The arguments above lead to the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: Discretionary accruals are positively related with a CEOs variable salary compensation 
prior to routine CEO departure 
 
H2: Research and development expenses are more likely to reduce in the final year prior to 
routine CEO departure 
2.4.1.2 Post horizon problem 
The post horizon problem occurs when departing CEOs have incentives to obtain a 
directorship or a better employment after departure (Ronen & Yaari, 2008). According to 
Brickley, Coles and Linck (1999) and Reitenga and Tearney (2003) accounting performance 
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is positively related to the probability that the departing CEO will retain a board seat. This 
suggests that CEOs might have incentives to use discretionary accruals to manipulate reported 
earnings upwards in his or her final years.  
This leads to the following hypothesis:  
H3: Discretionary accruals are positively related with receiving a directorship after routine 
CEO departure 
2.4.2 Board structure 
It can be discussed whether corporate boards matter because their day-to-day impact is 
difficult to observe. However, when things go wrong, as in a bad investment decision taken 
by the CEO, boards usually become the center of attention (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2010). In order to understand the hypotheses under section 2.4.3.1 and 2.4.3.2 and its potential 
impact on and the actions undertaken by the departing CEO, it is important to understand and 
highlight the tasks assigned to the board of directors. 
 
The board is hired by the firm and aims to act in the best interest of the shareholders. 
Therefore, the board shall ensure that the actions taken by the CEO align with the 
shareholders interest. However, as discussed under section 2.2 there might be a separation of 
ownership and control in public corporations (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The board of directors 
has the responsibility of controlling the process by which top executives are hired, promoted 
and assessed. If necessary they shall also take the decision of firing a bad performing CEO 
(Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010).  
 
The boards in U.S. listed firms follow the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. SOX is stipulated as a law 
with strict penalties for non-compliance. On the contrary, Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ 
OMX or NGM Equity follow the Swedish Corporate Governance Code which is based on the 
principle comply or explain.  
2.4.3.1 Board size 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argue that a large board size has behavioral 
norms that contribute to less open discussions of managerial performance. The researchers 
state that due to the poor communication and decision-making the effectiveness of such larger 
board groups decline. Jensen (1993) finds that smaller boards are more effective in 
monitoring the managers than larger boards. Yermack (1996) finds evidence consistent with 
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Jensen (1993). Similarly, Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) argue that larger boards are 
more susceptible to the influence of the CEO and being less effective, and therefore state that 
the size of the board is expected to be associated with less effective board monitoring. 
Therefore, if smaller boards are more effective in monitoring the managers, this should lead to 
less earnings management being executed. The Swedish Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
states that a board must involve at least three members, whereas one of the members is 
appointed chair. The average board size in Sweden is 10.9 directors, while the average board 
size in the U.S. is 10.7 (Nordic Board Index, 2012). Prior studies find that a board size of four 
to six members might be more effective as smaller boards are able to communicate more 
effectively and make well-timely strategic decisions (Jensen, 1993; Yermack; 1996). The 
arguments above lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: Board size is positively related to discretionary accruals in the years prior to routine CEO 
departure 
2.4.3.2 Board independence 
A departing CEO’s ability to use discretionary accruals may be affected by the composition of 
the board of directors. Fama (1980) argues that outside directors are vitally important in order 
to create a board that serves as an important monitoring mechanism of the management. The 
Swedish Corporate Governance Code (2010) states that the majority of the board members 
should be independent in relation to the firm and the management. The Code also states that at 
least two of these board members should be independent in relation to the shareholders. In 
comparison to U.S. firms where CEO duality is allowed (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2010), a Swedish public firm’s CEO is not allowed to be the chairman of the board during his 
or her tenure. However, CEOs are allowed to be a member of the board (Bolagsverket, 
2014).  Independent directors can be considered to be more objective against a CEOs action 
than dependent directors and are probably better from a shareholder perspective. Independent 
directors care about their public reputation and are therefore more likely to argue for the 
remove of a poorly performing CEO (Warther, 1998). A successful CEO receives a higher 
bargaining power and studies shows that the more power a CEO gain, the less independent 
becomes the board, since the CEO prefers to remain in his or her position rather than being 
fired (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). According to 
Weisbach (1988) a board consisting of a majority of independent directors is more likely to 
dismiss a CEO for poor performance. Similarly to Weisbach (1988), Reitenga and Tearney 
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(2003) finds that independent board members are an effective governance mechanism, 
meaning that outside directors mitigate agency problems. Based on these arguments, the 
hypothesis is stated as follows. 
 
H5: The proportion of independent board members is negatively related to discretionary 
accruals in the years prior to routine CEO departure 
2.4.3 Ownership  
As stated under Section 2.2, there is a tradeoff between an executives desire and the desire of 
investors. Similarly to the board of directors, investors might have a large impact on a CEO’s 
incentives to manipulate discretionary accruals prior to leaving office. 
2.4.3.1 Institutional ownership 
Institutional stockholders may have an impact on actions taken by the departing CEO as they, 
due to their large stockholdings, could become effective monitors and reduce the probability 
of CEOs manipulating accruals. Prior research show that the amount of stock held by 
institutional stockholders has a negative relationship to discretionary accruals (Peasnell, Pope 
& Young, 1999) and a positive relationship to research and development expenditures 
(Hansen & Hill, 1991). Nevertheless, Cheng and Reitenga (2009) find that institutional 
investors effect on management behavior is contingent on the type of institution. The 
researchers show that small stakes held by institutions in firms tend to create pressure on 
management to prioritize short-term results. The threat that the institutional investors will 
reduce their stock holdings if expectations of earnings are not met may put additional pressure 
for CEOs to manipulate earnings in his or her final years. This is due to the likelihood of a 
CEO wanting to leave office on a high note. In accordance to the above arguments, this leads 
to the expectation of institutional stockholders creating a difficulty for CEOs leaving the firm 
to manipulate accruals. This leads to hypothesis H6. 
H6: The proportion of outstanding stock held by institutional owners has a negative 
relationship to discretionary accruals in the years prior to routine CEO departure 
2.4.3.2 Blockholders 
Similarly to institutional ownership, the expectation is that the external pressure from large 
stockholders may have an impact on the departing CEO’s behavior. A blockholder is defined 
as a stockholder that is not associated with management and holds five percent of the 
outstanding stock of the company (Reitenga & Tearney, 2003). Blockholders can work as 
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effective monitors, due to their large stockholdings and thereby reducing the likelihood of 
earnings management. Previous research shows that the probability of firms having a prior 
period income-decreasing adjustment is smaller when a blockholder is present (DeFond & 
Jiambalvo, 1991) and the probability of firms committing fraud when a blockholder is present 
is smaller (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1996). As a result, blockholders might make it more 
difficult for outgoing CEOs to manipulate accruals. Thus the H7 hypothesis is: 
H7: The proportion of outstanding stock held by blockholders has a negative relationship to 
discretionary accruals in the years prior to routine CEO departure 
2.5 Summary of theoretical foundation  
In Table 1 below the hypotheses are presented with supporting theories and empirical 
evidence.  
 
 
 
  
22 | P a g e  
 
3. Laws and Regulations  
The historical origin of a country is highly correlated with its laws and regulations (La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Selanes & Shleifer, 2008). Laws and regulations in turn affect the economic 
outcome of a country. This part of the study is thus of importance since the majority of prior 
studies are conducted in the United States. Therefore, there are certain differences between 
laws and regulations that need to be considered. 
3.1 Common law and civil law 
     There are two main legal systems called civil law and common law. The key feature of these 
legal traditions is that they have been transplanted through colonization or conquest from 
relative few origin countries to the rest of the world (Watson, 1974). Countries may adopt 
laws from both of the legal systems and are called hybrids, but generally a particular tradition 
dominates each country. The common law system origin from England and has spread 
through its former colonies and to the Anglo-Saxon markets. It was developed because landed 
aristocrats and merchants wanted a system that could provide strong protection of their 
properties and contract rights meanwhile limit the crowns ability to interfere in the market 
(Mahoney, 2001). Civil law, on the other hand, was adopted in France, during Napoleon's era, 
in the desire to use state power to alter property rights in an attempt to insure that judges did 
not interfere.   
 
There is a sharp difference between the ideologies underlying common law and civil law, with 
the latter one considerably more comfortable with the centralized and active government 
(Mahoney, 2001). As stated before, the majority of prior studies are conducted in the Anglo-
Saxon markets. These are defined as common law countries, meanwhile this study only 
concerns Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. Sweden is seen as a hybrid 
between civil law and common law (La Porta, Lopez-De-Selanes, & Shleifer, 2008). 
Common law stands for the strategy of social control that seeks to support private market 
outcomes, in comparison to civil law that seeks to replace the outcomes with state desire 
provisions.  Civil law is policy implementing meanwhile common law is dispute resolving 
(La Porta, Lopez-De-Selanes & Shleifer, 2008). This indicates that there is a significant 
difference in investor protection. Specifically, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008) 
find that common law provides stronger investor protection, while French civil law provides 
the weakest investor protection. This suggests that CEOs in firms located in civil law 
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countries, are more likely to engage in earnings management than CEOs in firms located in 
common law countries, such as the U.S.  As stated above the historical origin affects 
regulations and laws. Swedish listed firms follow IFRS as the general accounting practice, 
while U.S. firms follow GAAP. The authors highlight some of the relevant differences among 
the accounting practices that might affect the use of earnings management.   
 
3.2 IFRS and GAAP  
There exist some key differences between the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Practice 
(GAAP) and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). GAAP is considered as a 
rule based accounting standard compared to IFRS that is considered as more principle based. 
This implies that IFRS captures and represents the economics of a transaction better than the 
U.S. GAAP. Some of the major differences between GAAP and IFRS that are relevant for this 
thesis are presented below.  
 
One significant difference between IFRS and GAAP exist when it comes to intangibles.  Both 
IFRS and GAAP define intangible assets as a non-monetary asset without physical substance 
(Ernst & Young, 2011). Both accounting models require that there are more probable future 
economic costs and benefits that can be reliably measured in order to recognize the 
item.  Amortization of intangible assets over their estimated lives is required in both IFRS and 
GAAP, with one exception in GAAP for software costs. In both standards there is no limit to 
the period in which the intangible asset is expected to generate net cash inflows. However, 
there are differences as well. For instance, in GAAP development costs are expensed as they 
incur, meanwhile in IFRS development costs are capitalized when: “technical and economic 
feasibility of a project can be demonstrated in accordance with specific criteria including: 
intend to complete the asset, and ability to sell the asset in the future.” (Ernst & Young, 2011, 
p. 16). Substudy 2 of this thesis focuses on research and development expenses.  Prior studies 
made in the U.S market find that in order to receive a higher bonus, CEOs tend to decrease 
research and development expenses by using real earnings management prior to leaving the 
office (Dechow & Sloan, 1991).  
 
When it comes to the disclosure of inventory, there are differences between IFRS and GAAP. 
Under GAAP you can apply either LIFO
5
 or FIFO
6
 when accounting for inventory. This is 
                                                          
5
 Last in first out 
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prohibited in IFRS where only FIFO is allowed (Ernst & Young, 2011). During increasing 
prices LIFO can provide a comparable advantage since it can give a less taxable income and 
thus increase the cash flow. Write downs are also handled differently. If an inventory is 
written down under IFRS it can be reversed in future periods if specific criterias are met, 
meanwhile under GAAP any reversal is prohibited (Ernst & Young, 2011). Since Substudy 1 
is measuring the discretionary accruals based on a number of variables including PPE, cash 
flows, revenues and assets, which all are affected by the accounting differences stated above 
this part is important to remember, when it comes to interpret and compare the result to prior 
studies.   
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6
 First in first out 
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4. Methodology and data 
In this chapter both the research approach and research method is presented and motivated. 
The chapter will be divided into two substudies: Substudy 1 and Substudy 2. Furthermore, 
OLS-assumptions and potential methodological problems in terms of validity, reliability, and 
replicability are discussed. 
4.1 Research approach 
The aim of this study is to empirically describe and analyze whether and if so why CEOs on 
Swedish public firms, listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, use earnings management prior 
to routine CEO departures. The time period examined is 2007 to 2014. The reason for 
investigating routine CEO departures from the year 2007 is due to NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm being established in late 2006. Before NASDAQ OMX Stockholm existed, firms 
were listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange that had rules and requirements that differ from 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm (Aktiespararna, n.d.). The reason for including firms listed on 
regulated markets is due to the requirement that only regulated markets follow the Swedish 
Corporate Governance Code (Swedish Corporate Governance Code, 2010) and IFRS. 
Therefore, firms listed on trading platforms are not included. There are two regulated markets 
in Sweden one is NASDAQ OMX Stockholm and the other one is NGM Equity. The reason 
for not including firms listed on NGM Equity is due to NASDAQ OMX Stockholm being the 
largest market with the most listed firms and the largest turnover (NASDAQ OMX Nordic, 
n.d.). This study includes all Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm´s small cap, 
mid cap and large cap.  
 
Consistent to prior research, this study applies a quantitative approach which focuses on 
numerical data (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The reason for conducting a quantitative approach is 
due to the authors’ aim to capture all public firms on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm and to 
provide a more generalized empirical result. This study uses secondary data. Furthermore, a 
deductive approach is applied which represents the most common view of the nature of the 
relationship between theory and research. The theory and hypotheses deduced are presented in 
Section 2.4 Empirical hypotheses, which drive the process of gathering data in this section 
(Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
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4.2 Substudies 
The chapter is divided into two substudies: Substudy 1 and Substudy 2 and apply two 
different models: although, both substudies intend to examine the relation between routine 
CEO departures and earnings management. The Jones cash-flow model is applied in the first 
study and focuses on accruals management, investigating the amount of discretionary accruals 
used before a routine CEO departure. However, earnings management is not only executed in 
accruals (Bartov, Gul & Tsui, 2001), but also in investment expenditures such as research and 
development. Therefore, the authors apply a different model in Substudy 2 measuring the 
amount of real earnings management used on research and development expenditures prior to 
a routine CEO departure. Both Substudy 1 and 2 consist of the same population in terms of 
CEO departures between the period 2007 and 2014, although, the sample requirements differ 
and thereby also the sample selection. 
4.2.1 CEO routine departures - sample selection  
The first step in the sample selection process is to include all CEO departures on Swedish 
companies listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm in 2014. As the period of interest includes 
CEO departures between the period 2007 and 2014, the list is supplemented with CEO 
departures on firms that are listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm between this period, but 
might not be listed any longer. In order to identify all CEO departures during the estimated 
period, the authors use annual reports and the book “Ägarna och Makten 2007-2009”. As seen 
in Table 2 this gives a total of 219 CEO departures (see Appendix 1
7
), which results in 151 
Swedish firms. Furthermore, to detect the reason for a CEO leaving the firm, the authors 
search through press releases and Swedish newspapers such as Dagens Industri and 
Affärsvärlden. As the purpose of this study is to examine routine CEO departures all non-
routine CEO departures are excluded from the sample. A CEO departure is defined as non-
routine when a CEO leaves the office due to being fired, sickness or “taking time out”, or due 
to circumstances such as the firm having an acting CEO or due to M&A, as seen in Table 2. 
This reduces the sample to 125 CEO departures.  
                                                          
7
 Appendix 1 includes all CEO departures collected between the period 2007 to 2014 
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4.3 Research method for Substudy 1 
As mentioned Section 4.1, this study adopts a quantitative approach. In this section, the 
method applied and the data used to accomplish the approach is presented in details. Substudy 
1 examine if CEOs manipulate accruals prior to routine departure and which potential factors 
that can explain the use of earnings management. 
4.3.1 Sample characteristics 
The sample is restricted to (1) firms that have at least one routine CEO departure, (2) firms 
listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm between the period 2007 to 2014, (3) firms that have 
required data from the income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement at least four 
years prior to the routine CEO departure and (4) firms with variable salary compensation. As 
several years prior to the departure are examined, having long time-series for each sample 
firm is important. Finally, the firm must provide the routine departing CEO with variable 
salary compensation since the short horizon hypothesis predicts that the performance-based 
incentive pay will give the departing CEO an incentive to engage in earnings management 
(Reitenga & Tearney, 2003). 
4.3.2 Data Collection 
The data collection for the routine CEO departures are the same for both Substudy 1 and 
Substudy 2, as explained in Section 4.2.1.  Furthermore, the secondary data used in the Jones-
cash flow model mainly consists of accounting data. The data is collected from the database 
DataStream and the companies’ annual reports. Data for the explanatory variables 
institutional ownership and blockholding is collected from SIS Ägarservice. 
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4.3.3 Sample selection 
As seen in Table 3, the preliminary sample consists of 125 routine CEO departures. However 
one of the sample requirements, as mentioned in Section 4.3.1, is that there are available data 
from the income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement at least four years prior to 
the routine CEO departure. As seen in Table 3 this resulted in 37 routine CEO departures 
being excluded. Furthermore 8 routine CEO departures are eliminated from the sample as 
they do not offer variable salary compensation to the routine departing CEO. Furthermore 
 2 routine CEO departures are excluded due to uncertain circumstances, meaning that there is 
no clear information if the CEO received a variable salary compensation or not. The final 
sample consists of 78 routine CEO departures.  This gives a relatively good final sample, as 
only 37,6 percent of the 125 routine CEO departures are excluded and can be seen as 
representative in general. The final year for Substudy 1 is defined as the last year the CEO 
stays in office for at least six months beyond the fiscal year.  
     
4.3.4 Normal and abnormal components 
There is a general framework outlined by McNichols and Wilson (1988) for classifying 
accounting accruals into normal (non-discretionary) and abnormal (discretionary) 
components. The non-discretionary accruals, NDA, are legal and occur from transactions 
from the current period, such as depreciation. Discretionary accruals are illegal and occur due 
to accounting methods that are chosen in order to manipulate the result (Ronen & Yaari, 
2008). Hence, the reason for calculating the use of DA is due to it being considered to be the 
outcome of managerial opportunistic choices (Kalyta, 2009). DA is calculated by using the 
Jones cash-flow model as explained under Section 4.3.6. This means that discretionary 
accruals are equivalent to the use of earnings management in this thesis.  
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Discretionary accruals are calculated by taking total accruals subtracted by non-discretionary 
accruals. 
 
DA = TA- NDA  
TA= total accruals 
NDA= non-discretionary accruals 
DA = discretionary accruals 
4.3.5 Measures of discretionary accruals 
There are several models for detecting accruals management, as it is not possible to measure 
earnings management directly. There are several studies (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995; 
Cornett, Marcus & Tehranian, 2008; Patro & Pattanayak, 2014) testing and comparing which 
model that measures discretionary accruals best. In order to clarify the model with the highest 
accuracy for measuring DA, the most well-known models are explained and compared below. 
According to the Healy (1985) model non-discretionary accruals are measured by scaling the 
mean of total assets by lagged total assets. He states that the average of non-discretionary 
accruals is zero, as non-discretionary accruals follow the regression of white noise. Healy 
(1985) argues that there is earnings management if the value of total accruals is non-zero. 
 
The DeAngelo model measures non-discretionary accruals by using last period’s total 
accruals scaled by lagged total assets. This model is seen as a special case of the Healy model, 
where the non-discretionary accruals estimation period is limited to previous year’s 
observation (Dechow, Sloan & Sweeney, 1995). Similar to the Healy Model, the DeAngelo 
model use total accruals from the estimation period to proxy for expected non-discretionary 
accruals. According to Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) both models measure non-
discretionary accruals without error if the non-discretionary accruals are constant over time, 
and discretionary accruals have a mean of zero in the estimation period. However, the models 
tend to measure NDA with error, if non-discretionary changes over time (Bartov, Gul & Tsui, 
2001). While the Healy model assumes that NDA follow the regression of white noise, which 
is a mean reverting process, the DeAngelo model assumes that non-discretionary accruals 
follow a random walk process (Bartov, Gul & Tsui, 2001). Hence, the most appropriate model 
when DA changes over time is resultant from the nature of the time series process generating 
non-discretionary accruals. There is a small chance that the assumption that non-discretionary 
accruals is empirically descriptive, as NDA is impacted by the economic circumstances, and 
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therefore changes over time. This implies that there is a high probability that both the Healy 
Model and the DeAngelo model will give faulty measurements of earnings management. 
 
In contrast to the Healy model and the DeAngelo model, the Jones model endeavors to control 
for the effect of economic circumstances on NDA (Bartov, Gul & Tsui, 2001), implying that 
the Jones model does not assume that non-discretionary accruals are constant. Jones (1991) 
shows that the model manages to explain one quarter of the change in TA (Dechow, Sloan & 
Sweeney, 1995). One of the weaknesses of the Jones model is that it assumes that revenues 
are non-discretionary (Ronen & Yaari, 2008), implying that firms do not manage revenues 
before the event (routine CEO departure). However the Jones-model has been developed and 
improved over the years. A version of it called the modified Jones model does consider 
earnings management in revenues
8
 (Ronen & Yaari, 2008).  
 
  Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2001) draw the conclusion that the modified Jones model is able to 
consistently detect earnings management and that both the Jones model and the modified 
Jones model perform better than the Healy model and the DeAngelo model in detecting 
earnings management. Consequently, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) conclusion shows 
that the modified Jones model tends to have the lowest standard deviation among the models 
they tested including both the Healy model and the DeAngelo model. 
 
Furthermore, a third version of the Jones model called the Jones cash flow model includes 
measuring earnings management in operating cash flows. According to Dechow (1994) 
discretionary accruals are negatively associated to cash flows, which is consistent with 
accruals leading cash flows. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the authors measure 
earnings management by applying the Jones cash flow model on Substudy 1.  
 
4.3.6 Jones cash-flow model 
This study applies the Jones cash flow model to measure the use of discretionary accruals. 
However, this version of the Jones cash flow model includes operating cash flow. According 
to Dechow (1994) discretionary accruals have a negative relationship to cash flows, which is 
consistent with accruals leading cash flows and with incentives to manipulate earnings. For 
instance, a positive cash flow can point out a strong performance, which will reduce a CEO’s 
                                                          
8
 This is the only adjustment made in the modified Jones model, in comparison to the Jones model (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008). 
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incentives to use accruals to increase earnings. Respectively a negative cash flow can point 
out a weak performance, which will increase a CEO’s incentives to use accruals to increase 
earnings. Furthermore in order to reduce heteroscedasticity (Jones, 1991) the variables in 
Jones cash flow model are scaled by the prior year’s assets. The Jones cash flow model 
(Cornett, Marcus & Tehranian, 2008) is presented below. 
 
 
 
 
The first step in the Jones cash flow model is to estimate normal accruals scaled by assets by 
performing Equation 1a. Each variable that is included in Equation 1a and Equation 1b is 
explained under the equations, for instance total accruals, TAi, denotes for total accruals for 
firm i. Equation 1a and Equation 1b are computed by using cross-sectional data.  The firm-
specific estimate α1, α2, and α3, are obtained yearly by using Equation 1a in the estimation 
period, as the authors want to calculate the proportion of discretionary accruals that is 
executed yearly. By dividing each variable with last year’s total assets, it is possible to avoid 
heteroscedasticity and make a comparison between firms (Jones, 1991). Equation 1b is used 
to estimate the discretionary accruals as a fraction of assets, DA%, where hats in the equation 
are denoted from regression Equation 1a. Accordingly, to measure propensities for earnings 
management the dependent variable, DA%, is adjusted to the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (Cornett, Marcus & Tehranian, 2008). The reason for the adjustment to absolute 
values is that the authors aim to examine the use of all accruals management.  If only 
discretionary accruals are accounted for, and not the absolute values, positive and negative 
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values will cancel each other out when analyzing the average. To be able to detect earnings 
management the Jones cash flow model makes certain assumptions. For instance, all changes 
in net sales, between the years, where products are sold in credit are assumed to be earnings 
management as it is easier to manipulate receivables than cash sales. The original Jones model 
(Jones, 1993) did not consider for changes in sales, and did therefore not measure earnings 
management arising from sales. 
 
A weakness with the Jones cash flow model is that it only measures earnings management on 
accruals. According to Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2011) earnings management is not only 
executed on accruals, but also by manipulating research and development. This thesis takes 
this weakness into consideration in Substudy 2 by testing if CEOs tend to manipulate research 
and development expenses prior to routine departure. 
4.3.7 Choice of data regression 
According to prior research accrual based models are estimated by using time series data, 
cross-sectional data or panel data. Therefore it is relevant to discuss the best type for the Jones 
cash flow model.   
 
A first alternative is time series. Jones (1991) applies a time series version to her model in 
order to estimate discretionary accruals. Time series is used as accruals cannot be destroyed or 
created, but needs to be moved from one year to another. This assumes that total accruals are 
zero when examining a longer time period. The advantage of using time series to estimate 
discretionary accruals is that the coefficients in the model are specified for each firm’s 
conditions. Although in order to have this advantage and receive a reliable estimation of a 
firm’s accruals, it requires a larger amount of data for a longer period. The large amount of 
data required leads to a decrease in total observations. However, despite the advantage of time 
series specifications, empirical evidence reported by Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) and 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) show that applying a firm specific time series regression 
to estimate DA leads to considerable imprecision. The disadvantages of applying time series 
to the model, such as the presumption that the variables in the Jones cash-flow model to be 
constant over time, leads to it rarely being used by later research.  
 
A second alternative to estimate discretionary accruals is panel data, a combination of cross 
section and time series. According to Arellano (2003) panel data is applicable when retrieved 
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data is a combination of different individuals and years. An advantage of using panel data is 
that unobservable heterogeneity becomes observable. Firm-specific effects that theoretically 
exist in the sample are adjusted by fixed effects. The adjustment is made by creating a dummy 
variable for each firm in order to capture the firm-specific effect. Another advantage is that 
panel data enables the detection of effects that are not possible to find by using time series or 
cross-sectional data (Baltagi, 2011). Despite the advantages, the sample in this particular 
study includes too many firms and too few years, therefore the regression is practically 
lacking power to detect discretionary accruals.  
 
A third alternative is to apply cross-sectional data on the Jones cash flow model. Cross-
sectional procedures are according to Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) now more widely 
applied in earnings management research.  Cross-sectional data estimate a firm’s normal 
accruals each year separately, as an average for the market. An advantage of using a cross-
sectional method is that a larger sample and subgroup is obtained. According to Kasznik 
(1999), the cross-sectional method controls for market effects that vary between the years. 
Estimating discretionary accruals by using a cross-sectional model should end in a larger 
sample size and be less subject to survivorship bias than a time-series model would (Bartov, 
Gul & Tsui, 2000). A negative aspect of using the cross-sectional method is that it does not 
take each firms uniqueness into account, as a subgroup is used. Therefore, it is important to 
create subgroups that give a true and fair view. Prior research which applies the cross-
sectional method on the Jones cash flow model creates subgroups in different ways. While 
Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian (2008) divide them into industry, Siregar and Utama (2008) 
divide their sample into manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms.  
     
Considering both the advantages and disadvantages using time series data, cross-sectional 
data or panel data the authors of this study decide to apply the cross-sectional method on the 
Jones cash flow model. However, as mentioned above it is important to create subgroups that 
give a true and fair view.  There are not a large enough amount of firms in the sample in order 
to divide the firms into industries. An alternative could be to join similar industries with each 
other, but the authors of this study do not consider this to give a true and fair view. Another 
alternative could be to follow Reitenga and Tearney (2003) who examine earnings 
management prior to routine CEO departure. Their sample only consists of manufacturing 
firms, and concludes that their sample is too small to divide into industry groups.  However, 
as this study aims to examine all firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm the sample does 
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not only consist of manufacturing firms. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the authors 
follow Siregar and Utama’s (2008) definition of subgroups, who divide their sample into 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. The sample is divided into 29 non-
manufacturing firms and 48 manufacturing firms.   
4.4 Explanatory variables for Substudy 1  
In order to examine whether the short horizon hypothesis and post horizon hypothesis actually 
exist and is a problem during routine CEO departures, two main variables are collected. For 
the short horizon hypothesis the variable collected is variable salary compensation and for the 
post horizon hypothesis a dummy variable that captures whether the CEO becomes director 
after departure is created. However, to be able to examine whether other potential factors 
might explain the outcome, other variables are collected. These are partly selected based on 
the hypotheses presented in Table 1 under Section 2.5, but also on what is considered to be of 
importance in this study. The explanatory variables are divided into 3 subgroups: corporate 
governance, ownership and firm characteristics.   
4.4.1 CEO compensation 
The authors of this study predict that the departing CEO might have different incentives to 
behave opportunistically before leaving the office. As discussed before, prior research finds 
that accounting performance is positively associated with CEO compensation. In order to 
control for the short horizon hypothesis a variable compensation variable has been collected 
through annual reports. The variable is measured as a ratio of the CEO’s annual fixed salary, 
see Equation 2. 
 
 
4.4.2 Directorship after departure 
Research shows that the routine departing CEO may have incentives to use discretionary 
accruals to manipulate reported earnings upwards in his or her final years, which results in 
hypothesis 2. The hypothesis is tested by collecting data from DataStream and annual reports 
two years after the routine departure. The hypothesis is controlled for by creating a dummy 
variable which is 1 if the CEO retained a board seat two years after leaving the office and 0 
otherwise. However, there is a possibility that the departing CEO knows that he or she will 
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receive a directorship which results in him or her less likely to inflate earnings in order to 
protect their long-term reputation with the firm.  
 
4.4.3 Corporate Governance variables 
4.4.3.1 Board size 
Another variable controlled for is board size. As discussed before, prior research argues that a 
larger board size is less effective in monitoring the managers in comparison to a smaller board 
(Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Core, Holthausen & Larcker, 1999). However, prior studies 
also find contradicting results. Siregar and Utama (2008) and Gulzar and Wang (2011) find no 
significant relationship between board size and earnings management. On the other hand, 
Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian (2008) find that there is a significant positive relationship 
between board size and earnings management. This suggests that if smaller boards are better 
at monitoring than larger boards, there should also be less earnings management executed 
when a firm has a smaller board size than a larger board size. The measurement for board size 
is the same as in prior studies, where board size is measured as the total number of board 
members. 
4.4.3.2 Board independence 
Several studies show that  independent board members have a monitoring function over the 
management (Weisbach, 1988; Reitenga & Tearney, 2003) and are assumed to have larger 
incentives to prevent earnings management in comparison to insiders (Cornett, Marcus & 
Tehranian, 2008). The Swedish Corporate Governance Code (2010) states that half of the 
board of directors in a firm should be independent in relation to the company and its 
management. The Code also defines independency against major shareholders. This thesis 
only focuses on independency against the company and its management, since it is more 
likely that the board members then are independent from the CEO. For instance, if the CEO is 
a member of the board, it automatically reduces the ratio in Equation 3 as he or she is 
dependent in relation to the company and its management. The variable is measured by 
dividing independent board members with the total number of board members excluding 
employee representatives and deputies appointed by the unions. 
 
 
36 | P a g e  
 
4.4.4 Ownership structure variables 
Institutional ownership is in this thesis classified as the 15 largest institutional owners in a 
firm. Similarly to Cheng and Reitenga (2009) the authors of this thesis want to capture 
different types of institutional owners, as the type of institution creates different kind of 
pressure on management, and therefore also the CEO. The variable is computed by dividing 
the number of shares that are owned by the 15 largest institutional owners by the total number 
of shares, see Equation 4.  
 
Furthermore, blockholders are defined as investors who own 5 percent or more of the firm’s 
total number of shares, which could include private owners, spheres and institutional owners. 
The variable is computed as the number of shares that are owned by non-managerial 
blockholders divided by the total number of shares, see Equation 5. The data for institutional 
ownership and blockholding is retrieved from SIS Ägarservice.  
 
 
4.4.5 Firm characteristics variables  
As stated in Section 4.2.1 this study consists of Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX 
Stockholm small-, mid-, and large cap between 2007 to 2014. All firms that have a routine 
CEO departure during this period is collected, thus there potentially exist differences within 
the sample. To be able to control for some of these differences the authors have decided that 
the following variables shall be included: market capitalization and the market to book ratio.    
 
The variable market capitalization is collected from DataStream. Prior research shows that 
larger firms are expected to be more monitored than smaller firms. In this specific sample it 
would mean that larger firms listed on large cap are expected to be more monitored than firms 
listed on small cap. This is due to larger firms having more stakeholders and investors than a 
smaller firm (Lee & Choi, 2002). Hence the CEO might not be able to manipulate earnings in 
the same way in large firms. On the other hand, larger firms have a tendency to use financial 
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instruments that are seen as more complex and therefore can lead to greater possibilities for 
utilizing accounting in order to manipulate earnings (Lee & Masulis, 2008).  Thus the authors 
expect market capitalization to be negatively related to earnings management. The variable 
market capitalization is measured as ln-market capitalization, so that the variance is closer to 
the other explanatory variables. 
 
The variable market to book ratio is calculated by taking a firm’s market value divided by its 
book value. The purpose of including this variable is that it is a proxy for the growth 
opportunities available to the firm. Firms with a higher market to book ratio, such as firms 
with higher growth opportunities, should have more opportunities for earnings management. 
This depends on these kinds of firms having more intangible assets that sometimes can be 
interpreted differently according to different accounting rules (Lee & Masulis, 2008). 
Previous studies find that the market to book ratio is positively associated with abnormal 
accruals (Klein 2002; Menon & Williams, 2004; Kalyta, 2009).   Therefore, this is also the 
expected relationship between earnings management and the market to book ratio in this 
particular study. 
4.4.6 Panel data regression for explanatory variables 
In order to conduct a regression on the explanatory variables, the authors have decided to use 
a panel data regression. This is done in order to capture both cross sectional and the period 
dimension.  An advantage with the panel data regression is that potential heteroscedasticity is 
observed and mitigated.  Another advantage is that panel data enables the detection of effects 
that are not possible to find by using time series or cross-sectional data (Baltagi, 2011). 
Equation 6 shows the regression. The dependent variable, which is the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals, is calculated in equation 1b. Furthermore, different tests are conducted 
in order to control for potential OLS problems. 
9
 
 
4.5 Research method for Substudy 2 
This part of the study focuses on the behavior of R&D expenditures during the CEO´s final 
year in office. The aim is to investigate whether CEOs whose incentive compensation is based 
                                                          
9
 The tests are conducted and presented under section 5.1 Substudy one 
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on earnings decreases their R&D cost for maximizing short term payoff, this study therefore 
only tests for the short horizon hypothesis in relation to real earnings management. As 
mentioned in the previous section, this study is conducted by using a quantitative approach.  
4.5.1 Sample characteristics 
Firstly, as mentioned in Section 4.2.1 this study examines all Swedish firms listed on Nasdaq 
OMX that have a routine CEO departure during 2007 to 2014. Secondly, only industries that 
have large R&D expenses are included. According to Dechow and Sloan (1991) industries 
with a R&D expense to sales ratio at or above five percent are defined as industries with large 
R&D expenses. The reason for including this requirement is that firms that have larger R&D 
expenditures may be able to reduce them to some extent without any larger notable 
differences. In comparison to firms with less R&D expenditures, where a change might have a 
noticeable effect and therefore reduces the CEO’s possibility to manipulate the R&D 
expenses without attracting attention. The sample is narrowed further by only including firms 
that have (i) no other routine CEO departure five years prior to the change and (ii) a variable 
compensation salary based on performance. The final criteria (iii) is that there are five years 
of data for the selected sample prior to the routine CEO departure for the variables: R&D 
expenses, sales and market value.   
4.5.2 Data Collection 
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1 the information about CEO departure is collected from annual 
reports and financial magazines, such as Affärsvärlden. In appendix 1 the information about 
routine departures, during the selected time period, is obtained. Furthermore, the information 
about the variables: R&D expenditures, sales and market value are collected from Datastream. 
However, variable salary compensation is collected from the firm’s annual reports.    
4.5.2.1 Sample selection 
Table 2 shows that out of the 219 departures, 125 are defined as routine, which equals 74 
different firms. As stated above in Section 4.5.1 only industries that have a R&D to sales ratio 
at or above five percent are included. This ratio is calculated on 74 different firms, which is 
done by calculating the mean of the R&D expenses to sales ratio for each firm, across all firm 
years, in the same industry classification. As seen in Table 4, the industries highlighted in 
green have a research and development to sales ratio at or above five percent. These are 
technology, industrials and health care. 
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In total, there are 76 routine CEO departures within the three selected industries. However, as 
there are certain requirements, as mentioned in Section 4.5.1, the 76 routine CEO departures 
are narrowed further. First, 23 routine CEO departures do not fulfill the first requirement (i) of 
having only one routine CEO departure five years prior to the change. Second, six routine 
CEO departures are excluded due to not fulfilling requirement (ii) of having a variable salary 
compensation to the CEO, resulting in 47 routine departures. Finally, 29 out of the 47 routine 
CEO departures do not fulfill the (iii) requirement of having data for five years prior to the 
departure for the variables: R&D expenses, sales and market value. This results in a final 
sample of 18 routine CEO departures, as can be seen in Table 5. 
 
 
4.5.3 The R&D-model 
There are not several well-established models for detecting real earnings management, to the 
author’s knowledge. Instead, prior research has conducted similar equations that attempt to 
measure the use of R&D expenses prior to a routine CEO departure (Dechow & Sloan, 1991; 
Murphy & Zimmerman, 1993). The authors of this thesis choose to follow Dechow and 
Sloan’s (1991) method. A drawback with their method, and thereby a drawback with this 
substudy, is that the final-sample only consist of firms with high research and development 
expenditures and will therefore not provide a general result.   The R&D model is presented in 
Equation 8 (Dechow & Sloan, 1991). The variables in Equation 8 are estimated from year 0 to 
year -4. Year 0 denotes the year when the routine CEO departure takes place, and year -1 to -4 
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denotes the year prior to the departure. Since some of the variables are estimated in year t-1, 
data is collected to year -5. Since routine CEO departures are collected between the years 
2007 to 2014, this leads to data being collected as far back as in 2002. As Substudy 2 includes 
expenses, such a long time period can lead to large uncertainty. Consequently, the numbers 
need to be adjusted in order to be comparable. The authors have decided to adjust them to 
2014 value. This is conducted by taking the Consumer Price Index list given on Statistiska 
Centralbyran and then adjusting the variables: R&D expenses and market value to 2014 value. 
Equation 7 presents how the CPI ratio is calculated. Appendix 2 shows the CPI and the yearly 
ratio. Thereafter, to adjust the variable of interest, it is multiplied with the yearly ratio for that 
particular year. 
 
The R&D equation  
 
 
 
Equation 8 is estimated with a panel data regression. The dependent variable is the change in 
R&D expenditures, consistent with Dechow and Sloan’s (1991) study. By having the change 
in R&D expenditures potential econometrics problems are avoided (Dechow & Sloan, 1991).  
4.5.4 Explanatory variables  
Before conducting the regression, the explanatory variables need to be estimated. The R&D 
model consists of two explanatory variables: the first one is a dummy that takes on the value 1 
for the final year and 0 otherwise. The second explanatory variable is a market value index, 
which purpose is to mitigate the endogeneity problem.  
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4.5.4.1 Dummy variable  
The short horizon problem is expected to be larger during the CEOs´ final year. The problem 
predicts that CEOs who have variable salary compensation based on performance decreases 
the firm´s R&D expenditures in order to maximize short term payoff during their final year. 
In order to collect the dummy variable (DUM) the final year needs to be defined. In 
comparison to Substudy 1 that has a four year window, Substudy 2 only focuses on the CEO’s 
final year at the office. Moreover, R&D expenditures are recognized as they occur, while 
accruals are recognized at the end of the fiscal year. Therefore, the definition of the final year 
differs. The final year for Substudy 2 is defined as the last year the CEO stays in office for at 
least six months beyond the fiscal year (year 0) and the year prior to the CEO’s departure 
(year -1). However, if the departing CEO does not stay for at least six months beyond the 
fiscal year, year 0 is excluded. The final year is then defined as the year prior to the CEO’s 
routine departure (year -1). Meaning that the last full fiscal year in office always is included. 
This definition of a final year differs from Dechow and Sloan’s (1991) as they always include 
year -1 and year 0 to the final year, however, the authors find it to be more reliable to define 
the final year for Substudy 2 as mentioned above.   
 
The dummy variable (DUM), in Equation 8, takes on the value 1 in the CEO’s final year and 
0 otherwise. The short horizon problem predicts that the coefficient of the variable DUM will 
be negative in relation to the use of R&D expenditures. A negative coefficient on DUM 
indicates that the change in R&D expenditures are below average during the CEO´s final year, 
indicating that the departing CEO is using real earnings management.   
4.5.4.2 Market index  
As seen in Equation 8, the regressions includes a market index (δ1∆R&Dm(i)t). The market 
index measures the economy wide changes in R&D expenditures. The reason for including 
the market index is to mitigate the endogeneity problem that R&D expenditures may contain 
an economy wide component. This leads to better estimation of the parameters and it 
mitigates the concern that the standard errors in the pooled regression are overstated due to 
cross-sectional dependence (Dechow & Sloan, 1991).The market index is a value weighted 
index of the change in R&D expenditures. All 74 firms in Table 4 are used to compute the 
index.  
 
The market value index for firm i in year t is denoted ∆R&Dm(i)t, and it is estimated by the 
following steps:  
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 The first step is to calculate a market value index for firm i in year t: Ujt=(Market 
Value)jt/∑k≠i (Market Value)kt.. This is done by taking the market value of firm i and 
dividing it by all the other firms (k) in the same year (t) market value. 
 The second step is to calculate the change in R&D for firm i in year t.  
 The third step is to multiple the market value index of firm i with its change in R&D 
(Ujt∆R&Djt). 
 The final step is to summarize Ujt∆R&Djt,   for all firms in the same year. This equals 
the market value index for each firm in each year (∆R&Dm(i)t,).  
4.6 OLS assumptions  
Substudy 1 consists of both a cross sectional data set to estimate the Jones model and a panel 
data set to estimate the regression for the explanatory variables.  Substudy 2 consists of a 
panel data set. Both Substudy 1 and 2 are using the OLS regression to estimate the variables. 
When conducting an OLS regression there exist five assumptions underlying the model that 
need to be fulfilled. If the assumptions are violated the consequences could be that the 
coefficient estimates and standard errors are estimated incorrect but also that the significance 
levels will be inappropriate. This could thus lead to both bias-, and incorrect inference 
problem (Brooks, 2008).  
 
The first OLS assumption is E(ut)= 0. This assumption means that the errors in the regression 
equation should have zero mean. This assumption does not need to be tested, because the 
mean of residuals equals zero in OLS (Brooks, 2008).  
 
The second OLS assumption Var(ut)= σ
2   
can be interpreted as the variance of errors should 
be constant and finite over all values of Xt and is known as homoscedasticity. If the 
assumption is violated there is heteroscedasticity. There are several ways in which 
heteroscedasticity can be detected.  The two most known tests are the Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
(BPG) test and the White test, which can be conducted in Eviews. If  heteroscedasticity exists 
but is not controlled for OLS will still give  unbiased coefficient estimates but the standard 
errors in the regression could be wrong i.e. too small or too big which in turn could lead to 
incorrect inference of the result. One possible remedy for heteroscedasticity is to transform 
the variables, take logs to reduce the size effects (Brooks, 2008).   
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The third OLS assumption Cov(ui,uj)=0 states that the errors should be linear and independent 
of one another otherwise there exists autocorrelation. The population’s disturbance cannot be 
observed thus the test for autocorrelation is conducted on the residuals (Brooks, 2008).  The 
reason for the occurrence of autocorrelation depends on bubbles or seasonal patterns. But it 
could also occur during omission of relevant independent variables, which are autocorrelated. 
If autocorrelation exist the OLS estimation will lead to coefficients that are unbiased but 
inefficient. The consequence could be incorrect inference of the result and a type II error 
problem, as when violating the second OLS assumption.  The most common way to control 
for autocorrelation is by conducting a Durbin Watson test, which tests for the first order 
autocorrelation
10
. A Durbin Watson statistic near 2 indicates that there exist no 
autocorrelation, while a Durbin Watson statistic near 0 indicates that there exist perfect 
positive autocorrelation between the variables. A Durbin Watson statistic near 4 indicates that 
there exist a perfect negative autocorrelation between the variables (Brooks, 2008).  
 
The fourth OLS assumption Cov (ut, xt)=0 states that there should be no relationship between 
the error and the corresponding x variables, otherwise there is a endogeneity problem. The 
endogeneity problem could result in biased and inconsistent parameters estimate. There are 
several ways to control for the endogeneity problem. A way to mitigate the endogeneity 
problem is by relying on modelling assumptions (Dougherty, 2011). A way to do this is by 
relying on panel data models as the fixed effect model or random effect model. Substudy 2 
already handles the endogeneity issue by including a market value index. 
      
The fifth and final assumption ut  ~ N(0, σ
2
), means that ut should be normally distributed. The 
normality of the residuals is determined by examining the skewness and kurtosis of the 
residuals. The normal distribution has zero skewness and a kurtosis of three (Brooks, 2008) 
One way to detect non-normality is by conducting the Jarque-Bera test. If the probability 
value is significant it indicates that there is a non-normality problem. The non-normality 
problem can be solved by increasing the sample size, transform variables by taking logs and if 
there exist few extreme outliers one can use dummies to remove them.   
                                                          
10
 First order autocorrelation assumes that the relationship is between a residual and the immediately preceding 
one ( Brooks, 2008) 
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4.7 Methodological problems  
Three of the most important criterias for the assessment of research in business administration 
is validity, reliability and replicability (Bryman & Bell, 2011). They are assessed in order to 
create credibility for the received results and its contribution to the scientific progress within 
the field. The first and most important criteria is validity, it assesses whether the conclusions 
that are generated from this study have a relationship (Bryman & Bell, 2011). The second is 
reliability, which refers to empiric reliability. It evaluates the studies ability of reliable and 
trustworthy results.  Replicability assesses the ability for an independent person to reproduce 
the study and receive the same results (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
4.7.1 Validity  
Validity is described as the rationality and the relevance of empirical data (Jacobsen, 2002). 
The intention is to examine how well the measurement methods applied, de facto measures 
the concept in question. In this case it examines the validity in the relationship between 
earnings management and routine CEO departure.  In order to show that the Jones cash flow 
model in Substudy 1 is the most reliable and best performing model when measuring the use 
of accruals management, a discussion is presented under Section 4.3.5. The R&D model in 
Substudy 2 is replicated from Dechow and Sloan’s (1991) study. 
 
This thesis examines routine CEO departures on firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm’s 
small-, mid- and large cap between the time period 2007 to 2014. The authors decide to 
examine a current period, which covers the financial crisis in 2008. Even though 7 years is a 
long period to examine, a longer time period that includes a whole business cycle gives a truer 
and fairer view on the use of earnings management prior to routine CEO departure. The 
authors only need to include three more years to cover a business cycle. However, as the 
system changed in late 2006 from the A and O list to NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, the authors 
have decided to set the time period from 2007. Furthermore, during the estimated period 
several listings and delistings have occurred. In order to minimize the risk of survival bias all 
firms that have been delisted during the estimated period, but have a routine CEO departure 
during their time as listed public firms are included. This increases the external validity and 
thus the transferability since the risk of distortion of the population towards companies 
reluctant to bankruptcies and mergers and acquisitions are avoided.   
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The data is collected from secondary sources which include: DataStream, SIS Ägarservice 
and annual reports. DataStream and SIS Ägarservice are two highly credible databases used 
by academics. However, all variables do not exist in these databases and is therefore 
supplemented with information from annual reports. 
4.7.2 Reliability and replicability 
Reliability and replicability is, as mentioned above in Section 4.7 two very important criterias 
for the assessment of a business administration study. Chapter 4 continuously provide relevant 
information for replicability for Substudy 1 and Substudy 2. Appendix 1 provides the full 
sample of CEO departures between the time periods.  
 
A strong reliability exists if the results over time are stable and if internal reliability exists. In 
this study, internal reliability is of high essence, since a regression analysis is conducted on 
the panel data in order to examine the explanatory variables. Thus, several tests are conducted 
on the population as well as on the regression equations in order to ensure proper results, 
which are presented and conducted in Section 5. The tests ensure that the OLS assumptions 
mentioned in 4.6 are fulfilled. A redundant fixed effect test is also conducted on the 
regressions in both Substudy 1 and 2 to control for potential cross-sectional or/and period 
specific heterogeneity that should be accounted for in the regressions.   
 
The reliability is partly dependent on the population. During the estimated period there are 
125 routine CEO departures. However, these are narrowed further within each substudy.  
Substudy 1 consists of 78 routine departures meanwhile Substudy 2 consists of 18 routine 
departures. The final sample in Substudy 2 is relatively small compare to prior studies that has 
been conducted in the U.S. However, the U.S. market consists of more public firms, which 
also should result on a higher number of routine CEO departures. However, the authors of this 
thesis follow the same sample criteria as prior studies conducted on the U.S. market. 
 
Inter-examiner reliability refers to that the study should have an objective approach during 
collection and application of the data. The information is collected from secondary data, 
which decreases the probability that subjective error is made. However, there is a probability 
that some data has been collected incorrectly due to the human factors in this study. The 
variables: CEO variable salary compensation, board size and board independence are 
collected manually for 125 firms during five years. This leaves room for individual mistakes 
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which could affect the results. To overcome this problem, a very accurate data collection 
method is designed when collecting and interpreting the result. In addition, random tests are 
conducted to compare the collected data with its source of origin. During the random testing 
no mistakes were found, which indicates on a good internal reliability. 
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5. Empirical findings 
This chapter presents the results of the use of earnings management prior to a routine CEO 
departure. The chapter is divided into two sections: Substudy 1 and Substudy 2. Finally, a 
table is presented that summarizes the result of the hypotheses tested.  
5.1 Substudy 1  
5.1.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Before analyzing the regression estimated in Substudy 1 the data collected and the variables 
estimated need to be controlled for. Therefore a descriptive statistic test and a correlation 
matrix test are conducted. The main point of conducting the descriptive statistics test is to spot 
any extreme skew and the kurtosis of the distribution in the variables, since the fifth OLS 
assumption mentioned in Section 4.6 is that the variables are normally distributed (Brooks, 
2008). The Jarque Bera test is conducted to test for this. As can be seen from Table 6, the 
Jarque-Bera test is significant for all the variables. A significant Jarque-Bera indicates that the 
variables are not normally distributed (Brooks, 2008). 
 
The maximum and minimum values within the variables, the median and the mean are 
presented in Table 6. The reader can see that the reason for that the non-normality problem 
exist is because there are extreme outliers in the sample, which can be seen in the large 
difference between the maximum and minimum values. One way to improve the chance of 
normality would thus be to use some method to effectively remove these variables (Brooks, 
2008). However, the authors have decided to keep the variables intact, since one reason for 
this outcome could be that the sample consist of firms from both small-, mid-, and large cap. 
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Further, a pairwise correlation is conducted on Eviews to make sure correlations between the 
independent variables in Equation 6 are not too high. As see in Table 7 there generally is no 
high correlation between the different variables. The highest correlation is 0,6 and between 
board size and ln market cap, this could be the case since size and market capitalization 
sometimes can be correlated in complicated ways (Yermack, 1996). The correlation will not 
have a major impact on the regression results, as near multicollinearity exists when the 
correlation is above or at 0,8 (Brooks, 2008). To make sure that the correlation does not have 
a significant effect on the regression for Equation 6 two more times first by dropping board 
size, second by dropping ln market cap. The result shows that there is no significant 
difference on the outcome. 
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5.1.2 Regression 
 
 
 
Table 8 shows the regression output from Equation 1a for the firm-specific estimates. The 
sample is in this stage, as previously discussed, divided into manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms. The firm-specific coefficient α1 that measures total accruals after change 
in revenues is adjusted for change in receivables. The coefficient results generally in a 
positive value in every period in the regression. This is consistent with the expected sign, as 
increased revenues should lead to, increased receivables.  Although, α1 for year -3 for non-
manufacturing firms prior to routine CEO departure have a negative sign. Even though this is 
not what was expected it is consistent with Kasznik (1999) and Siregar and Utamas’ (2008) 
research. Coefficient α2 is expected to be negative as property, plant and equipment often lead 
to accruals by depreciation. Table 8 shows that this is true for all years except year 0 and year  
-3 for non-manufacturing firms. Siregar and Utama (2008) result shows a positive coefficient 
on α2 in 25 percent of the regressions, leading to the conclusion that the authors result is 
reasonable. α3 that measures the change in operative cash flow is overall negative as can be 
seen in Table 8. This is consistent with both prior research (Dechow, 1994) and more recent 
research (Reitenga & Tearney, 2003) which shows that the change in operative cash flow is 
negatively correlated with discretionary accruals. 
 
Furthermore, R
2
 is relatively high for each period except year -3 for non-manufacturing firms 
which has a R
2
 of 11 percent. The average R
2
 for Equation 1a is 33,76 percent which is close 
to Siregar and Utama (2008) who have an average R
2
 of 35 percent with the lowest being  10 
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percent. Considering that Siregar and Utama (2008) who divide their sample into 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms, have a larger sample, this study has a good 
degree of explanation. Kasznik (1999) that divides his sample into industries and has 106 
observations on average in each period, receives an R
2
 of 42 percent, which suggests that 
dividing the sample into manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms might have affected the 
degree of explanation.   
 
 
Table 9 shows the result from Equation 1b for the Jones cash-flow model for each period. 
Discretionary accruals are presented for all years. Year 0 is the year the CEO leaves the office 
with a four year window prior to routine CEO departure. In order to give a more true and fair 
view discretionary accruals are presented as both as an average and median.  When the values 
are in absolute DA% all negative values are converted into positive values. The difference 
between average and median values of DA% and ABSDA% indicates that the sample consists 
of some deviating figures of firms that execute a higher degree of earnings management. 
Reitenga and Tearney (2003) exclude these kinds of extreme deviating figures but as the 
sample of this thesis is smaller in relation to their sample and other studies on the field, the 
authors choose to keep their final sample. Furthermore, if only discretionary accruals are 
accounted for, positive and negative values will cancel each other out when analyzing the 
average. However, as it may be of interest to discuss whether positive or negative DA is 
executed, the variable DA% is not excluded from Table 9. Table 9 shows that the firms 
included in the sample tend to use negative earnings management all years except year -1 
prior to CEO departure.  
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As can be seen from Table 9, the median of absolute discretionary accruals (ABSDA%) 
shows that accruals management (discretionary accruals) increases in year 0 and year -3. The 
largest spike is in year -3. However, in absolute values the average of discretionary accruals is 
only increasing in year 0. 
5.1.3 Regression on explanatory variables 
The authors noticed that prior research that use panel data when applying the Jones cash flow 
model, only uses a pooled regression (Reitenga & Tearney, 2003; Cornett, Marcus & 
Tehranian, 2008; Kalyta, 2009). However, as it is important to test for heterogeneity in both 
the cross-sectional and period dimension, the authors of this thesis conduct a redundant fixed 
effects test on Equation 6. The table is presented in Appendix 3 and the F-stat and chi-square 
show that the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity is rejected in both the cross- sectional and 
period dimension, meaning that there is heterogeneity which needs to be taken into account. 
The next step is to decide if the regression should be conducted on a fixed effects model or a 
random effects model.  This is done by conducting a Hausman test, which can be seen in 
Appendix 4. The results show that the null hypothesis of the random effect model being well-
specified is accepted. However, as the data is unbalanced it is not possible to run a two-way 
random effect model. The sample is therefore conducted by a random effects model on the 
cross-sectional dimension. However, the authors are aware of the possibility that the sample is 
being affected by period heterogeneity as well, as the data is collected from 2002 to 2014 and 
thus includes the financial crises in 2008. Therefore, the authors solve the issue by creating 
year dummy variables for the period dimension. In order to avoid the dummy variable trap a 
year needs to be dropped (Brooks, 2008). The authors chose to drop 2002 years dummy 
variable, since the most important changes will likely occur in 2007 to 2008, during the 
financial crises and not in 2002. The full regression with the year dummy variables can be 
seen in Appendix 5. Furthermore, by conducting the regression with a random effect model 
the endogeneity problem is mitigated, and the fourth OLS assumption is thereby not violated.   
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As can be seen in Table 10, the variable salary compensation is not rejected, which is 
inconsistent with the short horizon hypothesis (H1). The post horizon hypothesis (H3) is not 
statistically significant either. 
 
The study controls for corporate governance mechanisms, and shows that hypothesis H5 is 
rejected, which means that there is a negative significant relationship between board 
independence and earnings management. As seen in Table 10 the relationship is significant on 
a 5%-level, but is close to the 1%-level, and can be interpreted as a larger ratio of independent 
board members on the board leads to less earnings management. The explanatory variable 
board size that concerns hypothesis H4, that board size is positively related to discretionary 
accruals in the years prior to routine CEO departure, is accepted. The average board size of 
this study’s sample is 7,1 directors, with the largest board consisting of 13 members and the 
smallest board has three members, which also is the minimum requirement according to the 
Swedish Corporate Governance Code (2010).   
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Out of the ownership variables tested, institutional ownership is found to be negatively 
significant on a 5%-level, hence hypothesis H6 is rejected. This means that more institutional 
investors lead to less earnings management. The ownership variable blockholding, that 
concerns hypothesis 7, is not statistically significant.  
 
Regarding the firm specific variables, the results in Table 10 show that market capitalization 
has a statistically negative relationship to discretionary accruals. The variable is negatively 
significant on a 1%-level. The market to book variable is positively significant with 
discretionary accruals, on a 5%-level.  
 
As can be seen in Table 10 R
2
 is 13,8 percent, which can be seen as decent considering that it 
is an unbalanced panel data. However, the R
2
 indicates that there exist other explanatory 
factors that are not in this regression that can explain the outcome.  
  
The second OLS assumption, Var(ut)= σ2 mention in Section 4.6, is hard to test for when it 
comes to panel data. But one way to test for heteroscedasticity is to run a Breusch Godfrey 
test manually. This is conducted by firstly saving the residuals from the original regression in 
Eviews and thereafter squaring them and then running the regression of the squared residuals 
on the independent variables. The F-stat as can be seen from Appendix 6, is in this equation is 
insignificant. This tells us that the residuals are constant in the independent variables, which is 
an indication of homoscedasticity. Therefore, the second OLS assumption is not violated.  
 
The third OLS assumption, Cov(ui,uj)=0, mentioned under 4.6 is controlled for with the 
Durbin Watson statistics, that estimate the first order  autocorrelation. The result of the test 
indicates that there is no autocorrelation in the residuals, since the Durbin Watson statistics is 
1.59.  However carefulness should be exercised when interpreting the result, since it does not 
account for the panel structure of the data (Brooks, 2008).  
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5.2 Substudy 2 
5.2.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Just as in Substudy 1 both a descriptive statistic test and a correlation matrix test is conducted. 
 
As can be seen from Table 11, the Jarque-Bera test is insignificant for the R&D variable. An 
insignificant Jarque-Bera indicates that the variable R&D expenditures is normally 
distributed. However, the market index and DUM variable are significant, indicating that they 
are not normally distributed. By studying the maximum and minimum variables within these 
variables or just examining the median and the mean the reader can see that the reason for the 
non-normality distribution exists is because there are extreme outliers in the sample. 
However, the reason for including the market index in the first place is to be able to estimate 
the regression and take into account for market wide changes over time, thus the authors do 
not see any problem with this variable. The dummy variable is only introduced to be able to 
separate the use of research and development expenditures in the final year from the other 
years. Due to DUM being a dummy variable the authors do not find the significant Jarque-
Bera test for the variable particularly alarming and therefore leaves the sample as it is.   
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As seen in Table 12 a correlation matrix is conducted on the sample. It is conducted in order 
to test for potential multicollinearity within the chosen explanatory variables. As can be seen 
from Table 12 the correlations between the explanatory variables market index and DUM is   
-0,24, thus there is no problems in using the regression equation.    
5.2.2 Regression for Substudy 2 
Before running Equation 8 (the R&D model), a redundant fixed effect test is conducted in 
order to estimate whether there exist cross-sectional or period specific heterogeneity. As can 
be seen from Appendix 7 there is no cross or period specific heterogeneity in the sample, 
since both the Chi square and F-stat is highly insignificant in both the time and cross-sectional 
dimension. Thus the regression is conducted on a pooled regression with the OLS method. As 
stated in Section 4.6 by conducting an OLS regression the first OLS assumption is assumed to 
be fulfilled.   
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Table 13 shows that the variable DUM is negatively statistically significant at a 1 percent 
level. This indicates that CEOs during their final year in office preceding turnover are 
lowering their research and development expenses.  Thus hypothesis H2 is accepted. The 
coefficient on the variable DUM indicates that one unit change in DUM decreases the 
dependent variable with a 0,14 change.  The coefficient of the market index is positive but 
insignificant indicating that economy wide changes are not affecting the sample significantly. 
This can be seen as a bit surprising since the study includes data that includes the period 
during the financial crises. However, by including the market index the authors control for the 
potential endogeneity problem and thus the fourth OLS assumption Cov (ut, xt)=0, mentioned 
in Section 4.6. The inclusion of the market index may have improved the significance level of 
the variable DUM marginally.     
 
The R
2
 of 12,8 percent in the pooled regression is relatively high considering that it is a panel 
data which only includes 18 cross-sectional observations and 5 period dimensions. The value 
of R
2
 indicates however that there are other explanatory factors which are not in this 
regression that can explain the outcome. 
The third OLS assumption, Cov(ui,uj)=0, explained in Section 4.6 is controlled for with the 
Durbin-Watson statistics, that estimate the first order  autocorrelation. The result of the test 
indicates that there exist no autocorrelation in the residuals, since the Durbin Watson statistics 
is 1.78.    
 
The second OLS assumption, Var(ut)= σ
2
 is hard to test for when it comes to panel data since 
Eviews does not provide a built in function. Similarly to, Substudy 1 a manual Breusch-
Godfrey test is conducted. The result in Appendix 8 shows that the F-stat is insignificant as 
the p-value is 0,358. This tells us that the residuals are constant in the independent variables, 
indicating that there is homoscedasticity. The second OLS assumption is thereby not violated.  
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5.3 Summary  
As a conclusion, Substudy 1 and Substudy 2 show interesting results. These are presented 
below in Table 14. Furthermore, Substudy 1 also finds that the variables: market to book ratio 
and market capitalization affect the use of accruals management.   
 
  
Table 14 Hypotheses and results 
Hypotheses Result 
H1: Discretionary accruals are positively related with a CEOs
variable salary compensation prior to routine CEO departure
Accepted, insignificant
H2: Research and development expenses are more likely to reduce 
in the final year prior to routine CEO departure
Rejected, significant on a 1percent level 
H3: Discretionary accruals are positively related with receiving a 
directorship after routine CEO departure Accepted, insignificant
H4: Board size is positively related to discretionary accruals in the 
years prior to routine CEO departure Accepted, insignificant
H5: The proportion of independent board members is negatively 
related to discretionary accruals in the years prior to routine CEO 
departure
Rejected, significant on a 5 percent level 
H6: The proportion of outstanding stock held by institutional owners 
have a negative relationship to discretionary accruals in the years 
prior to routine CEO departure
Rejected, significant on a 5 percent level 
H7: The proportion of outstanding stock held by blockholders have a 
negative relationship to discretionary accruals in the years prior to 
routine CEO departure
Accepted, insignificant
58 | P a g e  
 
6. Analysis 
In this chapter the empirical findings are discussed by mainly focusing on the relationship 
between earnings management and routine CEO departure.  The analysis is based on the the 
aim of this study, which is to empirically describe and analyze whether and if so why, CEOs 
on Swedish public firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, use earnings management prior 
to routine CEO departures. Furthermore, in order to explain the empirical findings the 
chapter presents an analysis of both substudies: Substudy 1 and Substudy 2 by connecting the 
theoretical framework and empirical hypotheses with the empirical results. 
6.1 Earnings management and routine CEO departure 
The empirical results show that there is earnings management prior to routine CEO departures 
on Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. However, the extent of earnings 
management varies between Substudy 1 and 2. Substudy 2 measures real earnings 
management prior to routine CEO departure. The empirical results of Substudy 2 show that 
research and development expenses significantly decrease in the final year, which is 
consistent with the short horizon hypothesis. As mentioned in Section 4.5.2, the final sample 
only includes industries with a research and development expenses to sales ratio above five 
percent.  These industries are health care, industrials and technology. Thus the result cannot 
be generalized on all firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. Furthermore, neither can it 
be generalized on the three included industries due to the large sample loss. However, the 
result can be generalized on firms in health care, industrials and technology with high 
research and development expenditures. Similarly to Dechow and Sloan (1991), the result of 
Substudy 2 find that CEOs who plan to leave the firm, in industries with a research and 
development expense to sales ratio above five percent, are significantly lowering their 
research and development expenditures during their final year. However, the outcome in 
Substudy 2 is not consistent with Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) who did not find evidence 
that support the short horizon hypothesis. However, their non-significant result could depend 
on the researchers’ choice to include all industries in their sample.  
 
Prior research is conducted on U.S. firms where the recognition of R&D expenditures 
according to GAAP occurs directly, meanwhile, they only occur in IFRS when the item is 
intended to be complete and sold. Thus one might argue that this would explain the outcome 
in prior research. Since the outgoing CEO in U.S. firms does not receive the future benefits 
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but only the costs of taking on more research and development, which indirectly affect the 
potential variable compensation. However, even though the recognition of the research and 
development expenses occurs later in IFRS, the costs still occur before the potential benefits 
do. Since this still is a risk, even though the risk is a lot smaller than in the U.S., the CEO 
might reduce the investments in R&D a few years prior to departure so that the costs do not 
occur. That CEOs are willing to reduce their investments in research and development or even 
give up positive NPV projects, during their final year(s) in office stresses the importance of 
trying to mitigate the short term horizon problem.   
 
In contrast to Substudy 2, Substudy 1 includes all industries when measuring accruals 
management prior to routine CEO departure. As Substudy 1 includes all industries and has a 
relatively small loss in the sample, the result can be seen as generalized. The result show that 
the use of accruals management increases the final year compared to year -1 and year -2. 
Nevertheless, year -4 has the largest absolute value of average DA. The outcome in prior 
research differs in the use of discretionary accruals, accruals management, in relation to 
routine CEO departure. This substudy shows that there is earnings management prior to 
routine CEO departure, but it does not increase remarkably in the CEO’s final year. This is 
partly consistent with prior research (Brickley, Coles & Linck 1999; Gao & Shrieves 2002; 
Reitenga & Tearney, 2003) as empirical findings have shown varying results. However, one 
interesting finding is that the discretionary accruals changes from being negative to positive in 
the year prior to routine CEO departure. This indicates that CEOs generally uses positive 
earnings management to some extent prior to their final year. The difference in the empirical 
findings can depend on how firms value inventories. Firms included in this thesis sample 
solely follow IFRS and can therefore only choose to value their inventory according to LIFO, 
while prior research only include firms following GAAP that allows firms to choose between 
LIFO and FIFO. As this creates larger opportunities for earnings management for firms who 
follow GAAP, it indirectly creates larger opportunities for departing CEOs to manipulate 
earnings for their own benefit. 
 
The outcomes from the different substudies suggest different results regarding earnings 
management prior to routine departure. Substudy 1 finds that earnings management is not 
conducted more in the CEOs final year, meanwhile Substudy 2 finds that the use of earnings 
management is larger during the final year. According to La porta, Lopez-De-Selanes, and 
Shleifer (2008) civil law countries provide weaker investor protection than common law 
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countries, indicating that CEOs in civil law countries are more prone to use earnings 
management. As Sweden is not entirely based on the civil law, but rather a mix with the 
common law this might be the reason for the outcome of  Substudy 1. Therefore, there might 
be certain aspects of the common law that influences Swedish public firms concerning 
investor protection and thereby indirectly mitigates earnings management.  
6.2 Explanatory variables  
The short horizon hypothesis predicts that CEOs in a routine departure will try to increase 
reported earnings in their final year in order to receive a larger variable salary compensation 
(Reitenga & Tearney, 2003).  This study tries to examine this problem with two substudies 
and hypothesis H1 and H2. In the first substudy, the focus is on accrual based earnings 
management. This study cannot find a correlation between the extent of variable salary 
compensation and the use of earnings management. One explanatory reason for this outcome 
can be that the targets set for reaching the maximal variable compensation are very low, so the 
CEO will reach the targets anyway. Another reason for the outcome could be that the future 
career concerns for the CEO are more important than a short term high bonus payment. The 
career concerns imply that CEOs needs to build reputation through the records of their firm’s 
performance, since the reputation of a high quality CEO plays a crucial role in drawing 
lucrative contracts. This might lead to that the CEO tries to maximize the long term value of 
the firm and thereby does not act opportunistic. A third reason for the outcome in Substudy 1 
can be explained by the stakeholder theory that states that there is a larger focus on 
stakeholders in Sweden as the union have a strong influence on firms. Once again, departing 
CEOs might not want to risk their reputation among the stakeholders as it is important to 
create a high credibility among the stakeholders and opportunistic behavior could affect their 
future career. As the union or state does not have the same control in the U.S. this could be a 
reason for why the result differs from prior research (Reitenga & Tearney, 2003; Bebchuk & 
Fried, 2006). However, as stated above, in Substudy 2, the result shows that the CEOs during 
their final year in office are significantly lowering their research and development expenses, 
consistent with the short horizon hypothesis.  But as Substudy 2 only focuses on particular 
industries with a research and development expenditures to sales ratio at or above five 
percent, and therefore cannot be applied to all firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, it 
would not give a fair view to explain the outcome by linking it to the stakeholder theory. 
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The study does not find a significant relationship between the post horizon variable and 
earnings management. This is not consistent with Reitenga and Tearney (2003) who find a 
positive relationship between earnings management and the probability that the departing 
CEO will retain a board seat. The outcome in this study can depend on that CEOs leaving the 
office knows that they will receive a directorship and therefore did not have any incentives to 
inflate earnings. The outcome for both the short horizon hypothesis and the post horizon 
hypothesis could also depend on the fact that there are other explanations for a CEO to 
attempt to increase earnings in the final year. A lot of these factors have been attempted to be 
measured, but there are other factors such as reputation (Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, 2005) 
which have not been measured in this thesis. 
In accordance to prior research (Weisbach, 1988; Reitenga & Tearney, 2003) this study finds 
a negative significant relationship between board independence and earnings management, in 
other words the more independent a board is, the less earnings management is 
conducted.  The result shows that the routine departing CEO’s ability to use discretionary 
accruals is affected by the composition of the board of directors. This suggests that the 
recommendations stated in the Swedish Corporate Governance Code (2010) that a board 
should include more than 50 percent of independent directors should be followed to mitigate 
the use of earnings management. Despite the fact that the Swedish Corporate Governance 
Code is not stipulated by law with strict penalties as SOX, only 3 out of 385 firms in the 
sample do not have an independent board ratio at or above 50 percent. As the board is hired 
by the firm and aims to act in the best interest of the shareholders, it is more likely that the 
board will do so when the majority of the members are independent in relation to the 
company and its management. It is also more likely that an independent board takes the 
decision of firing a bad performing CEO (Adams, Hermalin & Weisbach, 2010). This might 
also explain the negative relationship between earnings management and board independence. 
The authors of this thesis expected a positive significant relationship between board size and 
earnings management, as smaller board sizes often work as a more effective monitoring 
mechanism. However, as seen in Table 10 this is not the case for this specific sample, which 
contradicts Jensen (1993) and Yermack (1996) findings.   
   
Substudy 1 finds a significant negative relationship between institutional investors and 
earnings management. The result is consistent with Peasnell, Pope and Young (1999) and 
Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian (2008) and applies generally on all Swedish listed firms on 
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NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. Hence, institutional owners function as effective monitors 
preventing the departing CEO from opportunistic behavior. As they function as an effective 
monitoring device, they also mitigate the possible agency problem that might arise between 
owners and management. It is often costly for the principal to monitor the agent, which in this 
aspect can be referred to as the agency cost of managerial incentives (Ogden, Jen & 
O’Connor, 2003). However when institutions invest in firms, they usually invest in a larger 
proportion of shares and have thus higher incentives to work as effective monitors. This might 
be one of the reasons for the outcome. Furthermore, according to Cheng and Reitenga (2009) 
institutional investors’ effect on management behavior is contingent on the type of institution. 
The negative relationship indicates that Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm 
have institutional owners that prioritize long-term results rather than short-term results (Cheng 
& Reitenga, 2001). This creates less incentives and pressure on the CEO to manipulate 
earnings in the final year(s). 
 
This thesis finds no negative significant relationship between the use of earnings management 
and blockholders. The result is not what the authors expected, since blockholders could work 
as effective monitors, due to their large stockholdings. This in turn would reduce the use of 
earnings management. The result is consistent with Reitenga and Tearney (2003) but 
contradicting to Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) 
findings. 
  
The study finds a negative significant relationship between market capitalization and earnings 
management on a 1%-level , which is consistent with Lee and Choi (2002) findings. The 
result shows that larger firms tend to use less earnings management in comparison to smaller 
firms that tend to use more earnings management prior to routine CEO departure. A reason 
for the outcome can be that larger firms have a higher amount of stakeholders that are 
attentive to the firm’s interest and survival, consistent with the stakeholder theory. This 
should lead to larger listed companies on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm being more monitored 
by media and analysts. Therefore, CEOs might not have the same opportunities to behave 
opportunistically as CEOs in smaller firms, with fewer stakeholders. Furthermore, the study 
finds a positive significant relationship between the market to book ratio and earnings 
management on a 5%-level, which was expected and consistent with prior research (Klein 
2002; Menon & Williams, 2004; Kalyta, 2009; Lee & Masulis, 2008). This means that 
departing CEOs at firms with a higher market to book ratio, such as firms with growth 
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opportunities, may have more opportunities to use earnings management since these kinds of 
firms have a higher degree of intangible assets with room for different interpretations of 
accounting rules. 
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7. Conclusion and proposals for further 
research 
Based on the empirical findings and analysis this chapter presents the conclusion by a 
discussion about implications and other concluding remarks. Finally, ideas on further 
research are presented. 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to empirically describe and analyze whether and if so why, CEOs 
on Swedish public firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm, use earnings management 
prior to routine CEO departures. 
 
The outcome of this study shows contradicting results. On one hand, in Substudy 1 that 
measures the use of discretionary accruals the outcome shows that the degree of accrual 
management is not generally increasing prior to routine CEO departure. On the other hand, 
Substudy 2 that measures the use of real earnings management shows that research and 
development expenditures are significantly reduced prior to routine CEO departure. The 
thesis also examines explanatory variables that can explain the use of accruals management. 
The following explanatory variables are found significant in relation to accruals management: 
board independence, institutional ownership, ln market capitalization and the market to book 
ratio. 
 
Prior research that controls for corporate governance variables finds that boards consisting of 
a higher proportion of independent board members are more effective monitors in comparison 
to boards with a higher proportion of dependent board members (Weisbach, 1988; Reitenga & 
Tearney, 2003; Cornett, Marcus & Tehranian, 2008). Consistent with prior studies, this is 
shown to be true in general for Swedish listed firms on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. 
However, a small portion of the sample contains of more dependent board members than 
independent board members. This could lead to the routine departing CEO having greater 
opportunities to affect the board members to vote through opportunistic suggestions that 
indirectly lead to earnings management. The Swedish Corporate Governance Code is assumed 
to have contributed to the increasing number of independent board members, but as there still 
are firms which do not follow the Code’s recommendation the authors suggest that it would 
be more effective to make this particular part a requirement instead of comply or explain.  
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Furthermore, the empirical result indicate that the differences between IFRS and GAAP that 
apply to Sweden and the U.S. respectively have an impact on mitigating a CEOs incentives to 
use earnings management up to a certain point. Nevertheless, the authors can not find that one 
country’s laws and regulations mitigate the use of earnings management prior to a routine 
CEO departure more than the other. However, interestingly CEOs in Swedish public firms 
seem more reluctant to manipulate discretionary accruals than reducing research and 
development expenditures. Although, accruals management probably is cheaper than using 
real earnings management, as real earnings management is likely to reduce firm value by the 
CEO delaying research and development expenditures. The tendency that departing CEOs 
rather use real earnings management than accruals management can be an outcome of the 
increased attention towards accounting frauds such as Enron and Trustor. 
 
The negative significant relationship between the explanatory variable ln market 
capitalization and earnings management highlights that departing CEOs in smaller firms find 
it easier to use more earnings management in comparison to CEOs in larger firms. An 
explanatory reason for this outcome could be that a larger firm has more stakeholders and is 
therefore higher monitored than smaller firms. Another variable in this study that shows the 
importance of monitoring is institutional ownership, where more institutional owners tend to 
lead to less earnings management prior to a routine CEO departure. The authors of this thesis 
find that institutional owners in Sweden tend to have long term goals rather than short term 
goals, which mitigate the CEO’s incentives to behave opportunistically. Both these findings 
indicate that the principal agent problem clearly exists between CEOs in Swedish public firms 
and stakeholders. Therefore, it is important to mitigate the agency problem by using different 
monitoring mechanisms such as including independent board members or attracting more 
institutional owners to the firm.  
 
The positive relationship between the market to book ratio and earnings management 
accentuate the possible loophole in accounting rules that leads to the opportunity for high 
growth firms to use earnings management. The positive relationship can also be related to the 
outcome in Substudy 2, since high growth firms usually have high R&D expenditures, as they 
in general also have more intangible assets. This highlights the importance of trying to 
regulate firms with a larger amount of research and development, since the outcome could be 
devastating. By CEOs neglecting positive NPV projects and only focusing on the short term 
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results, the firm value could easily be destroyed, which in turn have a negative impact on the 
stakeholders. 
 
As a conclusion this thesis contributes to earnings management research by demonstrating 
that real earnings management exists prior to routine CEO departures, while there tends to be 
less use of accruals management prior to routine CEO departures. The empirical outcome also 
shows that there are different factors to consider when examining the potential incitements for 
CEOs to act opportunistically prior to departure.  Therefore, the quote “Executives who place 
little value on future earnings relative to current earnings face stronger incentives to improve 
short term earnings performance. One class of executives who are likely to place little value 
on future earnings are those who have short horizon because they are expecting to leave their 
position in the near future” (Dechow & Sloan, 1991, p 54) is to some extent applicable on 
departing CEOs in Swedish firms listed on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. 
7.2 Recommendation for further research 
A proposal for further research is to extend the study by including Swedish firms listed on 
NGM Equity, since this list also is regulated, and therefore also follows the Swedish 
Corporate Governance Code. By including another Swedish market the sample for Substudy 2 
will increase and the degree of explanation might rise.  
 
A second proposal is to include more explanatory variables in Substudy 1. The R
2
 of 
Substudy 1 suggests that there are other factors that can contribute to explaining the use of 
earnings management. For instance, as the explanatory variable blockholding is insignificant, 
but institutional ownership is significant it would be interesting to also include a variable 
called spheres. Spheres are special for Sweden and are defined as a structure where group 
management and single firms are linked by one owner who has a large influence. The authors 
suggest that spheres can have a significant mitigating impact on CEO’s incentives to use 
earnings management prior to routine departure. Another factor to include in future research 
is independent board members towards larger shareholders rather than independent board 
members toward the company and management and conclude if this leads to a different 
outcome.  
 
This study finds that a departing CEO tends to reduce research and development expenditures 
to receive a higher compensation. However, a CEO can also have incentives to reduce 
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advertising costs and capital expenditures prior to leaving the office to receive a higher 
compensation. Therefore, a third proposal for further research is to examine real earnings 
management by measuring items like advertising costs and capital expenditures. 
 
Finally, as this study is conducted with a quantitative approach the authors have not been able 
to examine explanatory variables such as: reputation, honor or the desire to meet or beat 
earnings benchmarks. These are factors that might affect the routine departing CEOs 
incentives to behave opportunistically. Therefore the final proposal is to extend this study by 
including a qualitative approach. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
 
 
Company Industry Year Replaced CEO Reason for leaving Reason for excluding 
AAK Consumer goods apr-10 Jerker Hartwall Routine Not Excluded
Atlas Copco Industrials jun-09 Gunnar Brock Routine Not Excluded
Boliden Basic materials sep-07 Jan Johansson Routine Not Excluded
Com Hem Holding Telecommunications apr-14 Tomas Franzén Routine Not Excluded
Electrolux Consumer goods jan-11 Hans Stråberg Routine Not Excluded
Elekta Health care maj-14 Tomas Puusepp Routine Not Excluded
Eniro Consumer services jun-08 Tomas Franzén Routine Not Excluded
Ericsson Technology 2010 Carl-Henric Svanberg Routine Not Excluded
Hennes & Mauritz Consumer services jun-09 Rolf Eriksen Retirement Not Excluded
Holmen Basic materials apr-14 Magnus Hall Routine Not Excluded
Husqvarna Consumer goods okt-08 Bengt Andersson Retirement Not Excluded
ICA Gruppen Consumer services maj-12 Kenneth Bengtsson Routine Not Excluded
Lindab International Industrials sep-08 Kjell Åkesson Retirement Not Excluded
Meda Health care 2013 Anders Lönner Retirement Not Excluded
Modern Times Group Consumer services sep-12 Hans-Holger Albrecht Routine Not Excluded
NCC Industrials nov-07 Alf Göransson Routine Not Excluded
Nobia Consumer goods apr-08 Fredrik Cappelen Routine Not Excluded
PEAB Industrials maj-11 Mats Paulsson Retired Not Excluded
SAAB Industrials sep-10 Åke Svensson Routine Not Excluded
SAS Consumer Services dec-06 Jörgen Lindegaard Routine Not Excluded
Skanska Industrials apr-08 Stuart Graham Retirement Not Excluded
SKF Industrials dec-14 Tom Johnstone Retirement Not Excluded
SSAB Basic materials mar-06 Anders Ullberg Retirement Not Excluded
Swedish Match Consumer goods jun-08 Sven Hindrikes Routine Not Excluded
Tele2 Telecommunications 2008 Lars-Johan Jarnheimer Routine Not Excluded
Volvo Industrials 2011 Leif Johansson Retirement Not Excluded
Active Biotech AB Health Care aug-08 Sven Andréasson Routine Not Excluded
B&B TOOLS AB Industrials dec-12 Stefan Wigren Routine Not Excluded
Bilia AB Consumer Services maj-11 Jan Pettersson Retirement Not Excluded
Biovitrum Health Care maj-07 Mats Pettersson Retirement Not Excluded
Bufab Holding AB Industrials 2012 Hans Björstrand Retirement Not Excluded
Clas Ohlson AB Consumer Services sep-07 Gert Karnberger Retirement Not Excluded
Cloetta AB Consumer Goods feb-12 Curt Petri Retirement Not Excluded
Duni AB Consumer Goods jan-12 Nils Fredrik von Oelreich Routine Not Excluded
Fagerhult, AB Industrials dec-08 Per Borgvall Routine Not Excluded
Fingerprint Cards Industrials maj-09 Lennart Carlsson Retirement Not Excluded
Gant Consumer Services dec-07 Arthur Engel Routine Not Excluded
HMS Network Technology apr-09 Nicolas Hassbjern Routine Not Excluded
KappAhl AB Consumer Services dec-11 Christian W Jansson Routine Not Excluded
Net Entertainment Consumer Services okt-11 Johan Öhman Retirement Not Excluded
New Wave Group Consumer Goods maj-07 Torsten Jansson Retirement Not Excluded
Proffice AB Industrials dec-14 Lars Kry Routine Not Excluded
Qliro Group Consumer Services aug-11 Mikael Olander Routine Not Excluded
Rezidor Hotel Group Consumer Services jan-13 Kurt Ritter Retirement Not Excluded
SAS AB Consumer Services okt-10 Mats Jansson Retirement Not Excluded
SECTRA AB Health Care okt-12 Jan-Olof Brüer Retirement Not Excluded
SWECO AB Industrials nov-12 Mats Wäppling Routine Not Excluded
Unibet Group Consumer Services jul-10 Petter Nylander Routine Not Excluded
Vitrolife Health Care okt-11 Magnus Nilsson Routine Not Excluded
Acando AB Technology maj-09 Lars Wollung Routine Not Excluded
Allenex AB Health Care maj-11 Ingemar Lagerlöf Retirement Not Excluded
Beijer Electronics Industrials apr-08 Göran Sigfridsson Retirement Not Excluded
Bergs Timber AB Basic Materials 2012 Åke Bergh Retirement Not Excluded
Björn Borg AB Consumer Goods nov-13 Arthur Engel Routine Not Excluded
Bong AB Industrials jul-14 Anders Davidsson Routine Not Excluded
Brio Consumer Goods jul-08 Thomas Bräutigam Routine Not Excluded
CellaVision AB Health Care nov-14 Yvonne Mårtensson Routine Not Excluded
Concordia Maritime Industrials dec-13 Hans Norén Routine Not Excluded
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Diamyd Medical Health Care 2007 Anders Essen-Möller Routine Not Excluded
Duroc AB Industrials jul-14 Erik Albinsson Routine Not Excluded
Elanders AB Industrials jun-09 Patrick Holm Routine Not Excluded
Electra Gruppen AB Consumer Services nov-15 Anders Dahlström Routine Not Excluded
Elektronik Gruppen Technology apr-08 Johan Ålander Routine Not Excluded
Enea AB Technology maj-08  Johan Wall Routine Not Excluded
eWork Scandinavia Industrials mar-14 Claes Ruthberg Retirement Not Excluded
Feelgood Svenska Health Care aug-12 Per Sunnemark Routine Not Excluded
Geveko, AB Industrials sep-10 Hans Ljungkvist Routine Not Excluded
Global Health Partner Health Care maj-12 Per Båtelson Retirement Not Excluded
Intellecta AB Industrials aug-12 Richard Olsson Retirement Not Excluded
Karo Bio AB Health Care maj-11 Per Olof Wallström Routine Not Excluded
Knowit AB Technology feb-11 Anders Nilsson Routine Not Excluded
Medivir Health Care jan-09 Lars Adlersson Routine Not Excluded
MSC Konsult Technology dec-10 Muazzam Choudhury Retirement Not Excluded
MultiQ International Technology jan-13 Anders Laurin Routine Not Excluded
Net Insight Technology jun-13 Fredrik Trärgårdh Routine Not Excluded
Nordic Service Partners Consumer Services mar-09 Ulf Wahlstedt Routine Not Excluded
Odd Molly Int. Consumer Goods nov-11 Christina Tillman Routine Not Excluded
Poolia AB Industrials aug-07 Erik Strand Routine Not Excluded
Precise Biometrics Industrials nov-13 Thomas Marschall Routine Not Excluded
Prevas AB Technology nov-07 Anders Englund Routine Not Excluded
Pricer AB Industrials aug-07 Jan Forssjö Routine Not Excluded
Proact IT Group Technology nov-12 Olof Sand Routine Not Excluded
Probi AB Health Care maj-13 Michael Oredsson Routine Not Excluded
ProfilGruppen AB Basic Materials dec-10 Nils Arthur Retirement Not Excluded
Rederi AB Transatlantic Industrials aug-07 Håkan Larsson Retirement Not Excluded
RnB retails and brands Consumer Services feb-11 Mikael Solberg Routine Not Excluded
Rottneros AB Basic Materials jan-08 Lars Blecko Routine Not Excluded
Semcon AB Industrials apr-12 Kjell Nilsson Routine Not Excluded
Stockwik Förvaltning Technology dec-13 Jonas Arnström Routine Not Excluded
Studsvik AB Industrials aug-11 Magnus Groth Routine Not Excluded
Svedbergs i Dalstorp Industrials nov-10 Jörgen Ekdahl Routine Not Excluded
XANO Industri AB Industrials jul-14 Sune Lantz Routine Not Excluded
Nobia Consumer goods okt-10 Preben Bager Routine To short time period
Aspiro AB Technology 2014 Peter Tonstad Routine To short time period
Avega Group AB Technology dec-14 Jan Rosenholm Routine To short time period
BE Group AB Basic Materials okt-12 Roger Johansson Routine To short time period
BE Group AB Basic Materials 2014 Kimmo Väkiparta Routine To short time period
Hemtex AB Consumer Services sep-09 Göran Ydstrand Routine To short time period
Hemtex AB Consumer Services maj-11 Erik Gumabon Routine To short time period
Image Systems AB Industrials 2012 Mikael Jacobsson Routine To short time period
NOTE AB Industrials 2008 Kaj Samlin Routine To short time period
NOTE AB Industrials jun-09 Knut Pogost Routine To short time period
Ortivus AB Health Care 2007 Mikael Strindlund Routine To short time period
Probi AB Health Care jan-14 Gun-Britt Fransson tf Routine To short time period
Rederi AB Industrials dec-11 Rolf Skaarberg Routine To short time period
Sensys Traffic AB Industrials 2007 Harry Vesanen Routine To short time period
Studsvik AB Industrials 2012 Anders Jackson Routine To short time period
Svedbergs i Dalstorp Industrials jul-11 Peter Petersson tf Routine To short time period
TradeDoubler AB Consumer Services 2012 Örjan Frid Routine To short time period
TradeDoubler AB Consumer Services 2013 Urban Gillström Routine To short time period
Teligent Telecommunications 2007 Tomas Duffy Routine To short time period
Björn Borg AB Consumer Goods 2008 Nils Vinberg Routine To short time period
Medivir AB Health Care sep-11 Ron Long Routine To short time period
Medivir AB Health Care aug-14 Maris Hartmanis Routine To short time period
New Wave Group AB Consumer Goods maj-09 Göran Härstedt Routine To short time period
Enea AB Technology sep-11 Per Åkerberg Routine To short time period
Human Care Health Care maj-07 Anders Rothstein Routine To short time period
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Lammhults Design Group Consumer Goods apr-09 Johan Hjertonsson Routine To short time period
Midsona AB Consumer Goods dec-07 Lennart Nylander Routine To short time period
MultiQ International AB Technology jul-08 Thomas Keifer Routine To short time period
Poolia AB Industrials aug-10 Johan Eriksson Routine To short time period
Pricer AB Industrials aug-10 Charles Jackson Routine To short time period
Pricer AB Industrials dec-13 Fredrik Berglund Routine To short time period
Rederi AB Transatlantic Industrials dec-13 Henning Jensen Routine To short time period
Fenix Outdoor Consumer Services aug-07 Johan Vikman Routine To short time period
Husqvarna consumer goods 2011 Magnus Yngen Sickness Non routined 
Husqvarna consumer goods jul-13 Hans Linnarsson TF Acting CEO Non routined 
PEAB industrials 2013 Jan Johansson Fired Non routined 
Sandvik industrials 2011 Lars Petersson No clear reason Non routined 
SCA consumer goods 2008 Jan Åström Fired Non routined 
Securitas Industrials 2008 Thomas Berglund Fired Non routined 
Swedish Orphan Biovitrumhealth care aug-11 Martin Nicklasson No clear reason Non routined 
Tele2 telecommunications 2010 Harri Koponen Fired Non routined 
TeliaSonera telecommunications 2007 Anders Igel Fired Non routined 
TeliaSonera telecommunications 2013 Lars Nyberg Fired Non routined 
Addtech AB Industrials 2008 Roger Bergqvist No clear reason Nonroutined
Cision Consumer Services 2008 Niklas Flyborg Fired Nonroutined
Cloetta AB ser. B Consumer Goods 2008 Jesper Åberg M&A Nonroutined
Eniro AB Consumer Services 2010 Jesper Kärrbrink Fired Nonroutined
Eniro AB Consumer Services aug-14 Johan Lindgren Fired Nonroutined
Fingerprint Cards AB ser. BIndustrials 2014 Johan Carlström "Time out" Nonroutined
Gunnebo AB Industrials 2008 Göran Gezelius Fired Nonroutined
Haldex AB Consumer Goods dec-11 Joakim Olsson Fired Nonroutined
Haldex AB Consumer Goods jul-12 Ulf Ahlén TF Acting CEO Nonroutined
Lindab International AB Industrials 2013 David Brodetsky Fired Nonroutined
Mekonomen AB Consumer Goods 2007 Roger Gehrman TF Acting CEO Nonroutined
Mycronic Industrials 2012 Peter Uddfors Fired Nonroutined
Net Entertainment NE AB Consumer Services feb-12 Björn Krantz TF Acting CEO Nonroutined
Orexo AB Health Care 2007 Zsolt Lavotha M&A Nonroutined
Orexo AB Health Care 2010 Tobjörn Bjerke Fired Nonroutined
Proffice AB Industrials 2008 Lars Wahlström Fired Nonroutined
Swedol AB Consumer Services aug-13 Markku Piippo Fired Nonroutined
Systemair AB Industrials 2013 Gerald Engström No clear reason Nonroutined
Acando AB ser. B Technology 2009 Bengt Lejdström Acting CEO Nonroutined
AddNode Group AB ser. BTechnology 2007 Bo Strandberg Fired Nonroutined
Aerocrine Health Care sep-11 Paul de Potocki No clear reason Nonroutined
AllTele Allmänna Svenska TelefonabTelec mmunications 2013 Carlos Riera Fired Nonroutined
AllTele Allmänna Svenska TelefonabTelec mmunications 2014 Paul Moonga tf Acting CEO Nonroutined
Anoto Group AB Technology 2010 Anders Norling Fired Nonroutined
Anoto Group AB Technology 2011 Torgny Hellström Acting CEO Nonroutined
Arctic Paper S.A. Basic Materials 2014 Lars Eriksson Fired Nonroutined
Aspiro AB Technology 2007 Johan Lenander Fired Nonroutined
Aspiro AB Technology 2012 Gunnar Selläg Fired Nonroutined
BE Group AB Basic Materials feb-09 Håkan Jeppsson No clear reason Nonroutined
Bergs Timber AB ser. B Basic Materials 2013 Henrik Egnell Acting CEO Nonroutined
BioInvent International ABHealth Care 2013 Svein Mathisen Fired Nonroutined
Björn Borg AB Consumer Goods aug-14 Henrik Fischer Fired Nonroutined
Borås Wäferi Consumer Services 2008 Thomas Widstrand Fired Nonroutined
Boss Media Technology 2007 Johan Berg No clear reason Nonroutined
Bulten AB Consumer goods 2014 Johan Westman Fired Nonroutined
CashGuard Consumer Goods feb-07 Ove Wedsjö Fired Nonroutined
Cybercom Group AB Technology 2007 Peter Keller-Andreasen (TF)Acting CEO Nonroutined
Cybercom Group AB Technology aug-11 Patrik Boman Fired Nonroutined
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DORO AB Technology 2007 Rune Tobjörnsen No clear reason Nonroutined
Enea AB Technology mar-09 Åsa landen Eriksson TF Acting CEO Nonroutined
FormPipe Software AB Technology apr-13 Fredrik Thafvelin Fired Nonroutined
Geveko, AB ser. B Industrials apr-12 Stefan Tilik Fired Nonroutined
Global Health Partner ABHealth Care nov-11 Marianne Dicander AlexanderssonFired Nonroutined
Hemtex AB Consumer Services 2008 Anders Jansson Fired Nonroutined
Hemtex AB Consumer Services dec-08 Kia Orback Pettersson TFActing CEO Nonroutined
IBS Technology 2008 Erik Heilborn Fired Nonroutined
Image Systems AB Industrials 2008 Lars Taflin Fired Nonroutined
Image Systems AB Industrials 2009 Gerth Schyborger tf Acting CEO Nonroutined
Image Systems AB Industrials apr-11 Bengt Broman tf Acting CEO Nonroutined
MQ Holding AB Consumer Services jun-13 Mats Gärdsell Fired Nonroutined
Nilörngruppen Consumer Goods 2009 Stefan Tingström Fired Nonroutined
Nordic Mines AB Basic Materials 2012 Michael Nilsson Fired Nonroutined
NOTE AB Industrials feb-07 Arne Forslund Fired Nonroutined
NOTE AB Industrials 2010 Göran Jansson TF Acting CEO Nonroutined
Ortivus AB Health Care maj-08 Bengt Arne Sjöqvist TF Acting CEO Nonroutined
Ortivus AB Health Care 2011 Jan Andersson Fired Nonroutined
PA Resources Oil & Gas maj-10 Ulrik jansson Fired Nonroutined
PA Resources Oil & Gas 2013 Bo Askvik Fired Nonroutined
PA Resources Oil & Gas okt-13 Philippe Probst  TF Acting CEO Nonroutined
PartnerTech Industrials 2007 Mikael Jonson Fired Nonroutined
PartnerTech Industrials 2010 Rune Glavare TF Acting CEO Nonroutined
Poolia AB Industrials feb-14 Monika Eling Fired Nonroutined
Prevas AB Technology maj-13 Mats Lundberg Sickness Nonroutined
Pricer AB Industrials okt-14 Harald Bauer tf Acting CEO Nonroutined
Probi AB Health Care 2007 Rolf Bjerndell tf Acting CEO Nonroutined
ProfilGruppen AB Basic Materials jul-12 Peter Schön tf Acting CEO Nonroutined
ProfilGruppen AB Basic Materials aug-14 Kåre Wetterberg tf Acting CEO Nonroutined
Rederi AB Industrials 2008 Carl-Johan Hagman Fired Nonroutined
Rederi AB Industrials 2009 Anders Källström tf Acting CEO Nonroutined
Rederi AB Industrials 2011 Stefan Eliasson tf Acting CEO Nonroutined
Rottneros AB Basic Materials jul-13 Ole Terland Fired Nonroutined
Rottneros AB Basic Materials nov-14 Carl-Johan Jonsson Fired Nonroutined
Semcon AB Industrials jun-07 Henrik Sund Fired Nonroutined
Sensys Traffic AB Industrials 2008 Helena Claesson tf Acting CEO Nonroutined
Sigma Technology aug-08 Sune Nilsson Fired Nonroutined
Stockwik Förvaltning Technology jul-09 Bent Brugård TF Acting CEO Nonroutined
Stockwik Förvaltning  Technology dec-10 Berndt Karlsson M&A Nonroutined
Svedbergs i Dalstorp Industrials 2013 Anders Tofte Fired Nonroutined
TradeDoubler AB Consumer Services 2007 Martin Henricson Fired Nonroutined
TradeDoubler AB Consumer Services 2008 William Cooper Fired Nonroutined
TradeDoubler AB Consumer Services 2014 Rob Wilson Fired Nonroutined
Thalamus Networks Telecommunications 2007 Fredrich Dahlman Acting CEO Nonroutined
Tilgin Technology 2007 Jan Werne Fired Nonroutined
Venue Retail Group AB Consumer Services sep-14 Susanne Börjesson Fired Nonroutined
78 | P a g e  
 
Appendix 2 CPI calculations  
 
 
Appendix 3 Substudy 1- Redundant Fixed effect test 
 
Appendix 4 Substudy 1, Hausman test  
 
 
  
Year CPI Ratio 
2002 272,8 1,149157
2003 278,1 1,127256
2004 279,2 1,122815
2005 280,4 1,11801
2006 284,22 1,102984
2007 290,51 1,079102
2008 300,61 1,042846
2009 299,66 1,046152
2010 303,46 1,033052
2011 311,43 1,006615
2012 314,2 0,99774
2013 314,06 0,998185
2014 313,49 1
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Appendix 5 Substudy one, the full regression  
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Appendix 6 Substudy one manual BG test.  
 
 
Appendix 7 Substudy 2 Redundant Fixed effect test  
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Appendix 8 Substudy 2 Manual BG-test  
 
 
